Earticle

초록

영어

This paper examines how executive pay is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea as a laboratory setting, we find that member firm’s cash compensation for its executives is strongly linked to the stock performance of other members as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this link to other members’ performance is consistent with the hypothesis of corporate resources being tunneled from one member to another for the benefit of the controlling family. We find that the link is stronger in firms with high control-ownership disparity or low foreign ownership. We also find that the link is tighter to the performance of firms directly owned by the controlling family.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Hypotheses Development
 3. Methodology
  3.1. Sample Construction and Key Variables
  3.2. Research Design
 4. Empirical results
  4.1. Summary statistics
  4.2. Pay’s Semi-Elasticity to Its Own Performance
  4.3. Pay’s Semi-Elasticity to Other Member Firms’ Performance
  4.4. Pay’s Semi-Elasticity to Other Member Firms’ Performance
  4.5. Elasticity to the Performance of Other Member Firms with Direct Ownership
 5. Conclusion
 Reference
 Table

키워드

저자

• Hyungseok Kim [ Korea University Business School ]
• Woochan Kim [ Associate Professor of Finance, Korea University Business School and Research Associate of ECGI. ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330