Earticle

초록

영어

Using US commercial bank data from 2002 to 2012, this paper investigates whether wholesale financiers discipline banks by withdrawing funds from risky ones and/or charging them higher interest rates. Contrary to previous literature, there is no evidence for market discipline in terms of wholesale funding supply until 2010 when the Dodd-Frank Act was introduced. Risky banks obtain more wholesale funding than safe banks in the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, this result holds during the financial crisis period of 2008. Wholesale financiers demand higher interest rates for riskier banks only during the crisis and the post-crisis periods.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Hypotheses
 3. Background Information on wholesale funding
 4. Data and methodology
 5. Empirical results
 6. Conclusion
 References
 Figure
 Table

키워드

저자

• Sung Wook Joh [ Seoul National University ]
• Jeongsim Kim [ Seoul National University ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330