Earticle

초록

영어

We examine how controlling shareholders (or insiders) maximize their wealth in IPO process using Korean data. Specifically, we focus on the effects of ownership structure (direct ownership vs. indirect ownership) and their ownership change in Pre-IPO period on IPO pricing behavior and their share selling behavior in both secondary offerings and post lockup expiration. We find that controlling shareholders seldom participate in secondary offerings in Korea, especially when they control firms through direct ownership but they do sell their shares after the lockup expiration. The results show that when they increase their ownership in pre-IPO period, the probability of selling shares after the lockup expiration increases. We also find that the information momentum hypothesis by Aggarwal et al.(2002) holds for only direct ownership by controlling shareholders. Our results imply that controlling shareholders have strong incentives to maximize their wealth through IPOs, while they sell their indirect ownership at the IPO to disperse the ownership of the IPO firms.

목차

Abstract
 I. Introduction
 II. Sample and description of variables
  1. IPO related variables
  2. Ownership related variables
  3. Descriptive Statistics
 III. Multivariate results
  1. Ownership and IPO underpricing
  2. Insider selling after lockup expiration
 IV. Summary and Conclusion
 References
 Table

저자

• Hyung Cheol Kang [ Associate Professor, University of Seoul ]
• Sang Koo Kang [ Asian Institute of Corporate Governance Korea University ]
• Joonghyuk Kim [ Associate Professor, Korea University ]
• Noolee Kim [ Assistant Professor, Hanyang University ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330