This study examines the relationship between the ownership of controlling shareholders and corporate social responsibility in Korea under external financial constraints. Empirical results show that a negative relationship is observed only in firms with fewer external financial constraints, while it disappears for firms with greater financial constraints. We reach a similar conclusion when we use the level of environmental management as a proxy for corporate social responsibility. These results confirm that external financial constraints act as a monitoring mechanism and mitigate the agency problem of controlling shareholders.
목차
Abstract 1. Introduction 2. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development 3. Data and Methodology 3.1. Data 3.2. Variables 3.3. Descriptive statistics 4. Empirical Results 4.1. Univariate test 4.2. Multivariate test 5. Conclusion References Appendix Table
키워드
Controlling shareholdersConflict of interestCorporate social responsibilityExternal financialconstraintsKorea.
저자
Hee Sub Byun [ Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation Cheonggyechun-no 30, Jung-gu, Seoul, 100-180, Korea ]
Ji Hye Lee [ Korea University Business School 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, 136-701, Korea ]
Corresponding author
Kyung Suh Park [ Korea University Business School 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, 136-701, Korea ]