Earticle

초록

영어

This study examines the effect of directors' and officers' liability (D&O) insurance on the firm’s risk-taking behavior and firm value. We utilize a sample of period in Korea during which the disclosure of D&O insurance information was mandatory and there was a significant cross-sectional variation in the firms’ choice to purchase D&O insurance. We find that, controlling for the endogeneity of D&O insurance purchase decision, D&O insurance leads to greater risk-taking behavior of firms and also increases firm value compared to noninsured firms. We find that increases in risk-taking behavior and firm value are pronounced for firms with greater growth opportunities. These results imply that D&O insurance can be beneficial to firms by mitigating the risk-averseness of managers, particularly for highgrowth firms that can benefit more from such change in behavior.

목차

ABSTRACT
 I. D&O insurance in Korea and Descriptive Statistics
 II. Determinants of D&O insurance
 III. D&O insurance and corporate risk-taking behavior
  A. D&O insurance and stock return volatility
  B. D&O insurance and R&D expenditures
 IV. D&O insurance and firm value
 V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
 References
 Table
 Figure
 Appendix

키워드

저자

• Joon Ho Hwang [ Korea University Business School ]
• Byungmo Kim [ College of Business and Economics, Dankook University ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330