Earticle

초록

영어

This paper empirically studies agency con‡ict by using a shareholder approval rule gov- erning private placements. NASDAQ and other exchanges require shareholder approval for discounted, placements that make up more than 20% of existing shares. I document a distribution discontinuity around the threshold and identify many managers who avoid approval by keeping the fraction of new shares just below 20%. Shareholder avoiding …rms have negative and 4.43% lower announcement day abnormal returns than …rms that gain approval. Moreover, shareholder avoiding …rms are less distressed and issue at higher discounts. Overall, my …ndings suggest agency problems in privately issued equity.

목차

Abstract
 I Introduction
 II Shareholder Approval Rule and Data Distribution
  A. 20% Shareholder Approval Rule
  B. Data and Private Placement Distribution Discontinuity
 III Empirical Framework and Hypotheses
  A. Empirical Framework
  B. Misalignment Hypothesis
  C. Costly Approval Hypotheses
 IV Empirical Results
  A. Test of Distribution Discontinuity
  B. Returns by Shareholder Approval
  C. Logit Regression on the Decision to Avoid Approval
  D. Delisting Rates
  E. Announcement Day Returns of Firms that Issue without Approval
  F. Implication: Full Sample Announcement Day Returns
 V Discussion of Alternative Hypotheses
 VI Conclusion
 References
 Table
 Figures
 Appendices

키워드

저자

• James L. Park [ Korea University, Business School Main Building ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330