Earticle

초록

영어

This paper examines the effect of ownership structure of a controlling shareholder on the financial constraints of non-financial firms in 22 economies for the 1982-2009 period. We find that the overinvestment propensity of a controlling shareholder becomes less severe with an increase in cash-flow rights along with a greater deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights, which makes a firm less financially constrained. Our results suggest that firms in legal environment with stronger shareholder protections are less likely to have the entrenchment of the controlling shareholders, while minority shareholders in this legal origin benefit from loosened financial constraints.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Research on Financial Constraints of a Firm
  2.1 Ownership Structure and Firm Investment Propensity
  2.2. Investment Propensity and Financial Constraints
 3. The Model of Investment
 4. Data and Empirical Methodology
  4.1 Data Source
  4.2 Sample Selection
  4.3 Estimation Methodology for the Structural Model
 5. Empirical Results
  5.1 Estimation Issues
  5.2 Overinvestment Propensity, Ownership Structure, and Firm Financial Constraints
 6. Concluding Remarks
 References
 Appendix
 Table

키워드

저자

• Jin Ho Park [ Korea Energy Economics Institute ]
• Kwangwoo Park [ Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology ]
• Ronald A. Ratti [ University of Western Sydney ]

참고문헌

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간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330