Earticle

초록

영어

We conduct an out-of-sample test of the relation between acquisition return and governance indices for the extended period of 1996-2006. The negative relation between governance indices and acquisition performance disappeared in the post-SOX period. Further analysis shows that antitakeover provisions hurt firm value only when acquirers hold excess cash and external governance is weak. The presence of the interactive effect suggests that the wealth effect of takeover defenses is neutral. In addition, we find that strong external governance promotes firms to abolish some governance provisions and classified boards in particular. This partial elimination of governance provisions reflects a tradeoff between benefits and costs of governance provisions.

목차

ABSTRACT
 1. Introduction
 2. Related Literature and Hypotheses
  2.1. Governance indices and acquisition performance
  2.2. Excess cash holdings, governance indices, and acquisition performance
  2.3. The interactive effect of external governance mechanisms
 3. Description of data
  3.1. Sample selection
  3.2. Descriptive statistics and announcement period abnormal returns
 4. Empirical Results
  4.1. Corporate governance and acquirer returns in the pre- and post-SOX periods
  4.2. The interactive effect of governance indices and the strength of external governance
  4.3. Robustness Check
 5. The endogeneity of governance indices
  5.1. Three-stage least squares estimation
  5.2. The strength of external governance and the changes in governance provisions
 6. Conclusion
 REFERENCES
 Appendix
 Table

키워드

저자

• Seoungpil Ahn [ Sogang Business School, Sogang University ] corresponding author
• Jaiho Chung [ Korea Business School, Korea University ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330