Earticle

초록

영어

Vendor financing is credit instrument offered by a supplier to increase the sale of its product. Vendor financing is prevailing among riskier firms, competing primarily with short-term bank debt, revolving line, in corporate debt market. This paper models the differential contractual features of vendor financing compared to bank revolving line. When there exists positive mark-up due to imperfectness of intermediate good market, an intermediate good supplier can increase the sales and profits by offering vendor financing to risky borrowing firms. Therefore, vendor financing tends to service riskier borrowing firms than bank revolving line does in corporate debt market. To deal with the issue of corporate liquidity management in lieu of selecting short-term financing source between bank revolving line and vendor financing, this paper provides both analytical model extended from screening model and empirical analysis utilizing a unique database, LPC’s DealScan, for bank financing contract. The empirical analyses using Compustat and LPC DealScan data support the theoretical prediction.

목차

ABSTRACT
 1. Introduction
 2. Equilibrium Contract of Bank Financing
 3. Bank Revolving Line versus Vendor Financing
 4. Empirical Analysis
 5. Conclusions
 References
 Table

키워드

저자

• Byung-Uk Chong [ Associate Professor of Finance, College of Business Administration, University of Seoul ] Corresponding author
• Ha-Chin Yi [ Associate Professor of Finance, Department of Finance and Economics, McCoy College of Business Administration, Texas State University-San Marcos ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330