Earticle

초록

영어

This paper examines how syndicate structure affects the risk premium of international loan. Syndicate structure is an organizational response to informational frictions in the process of syndicate dealing. In a syndicated lending, lead arrangers retain fractions of the loan, but they act as the intermediary between the borrower and the syndicate participants. Between the two competing hypotheses of this paper – concentration hypothesis versus diversification hypothesis, most of the estimations support the diversification hypothesis. Lead arrangers possess relatively better information on borrowing firm than participating banks while participating banks also possess their own information on the borrowing firm. As the risk of a borrowing firm increases, participating banks can join the syndicate while requiring high risk premium for participation and the associated diversification of syndicate structure. Lead arrangers would diversify syndicate structure while they have to provide appropriate risk premium to participating banks.

목차

ABSTRACT
 1. Introduction
 II. Background on Loan Syndication and Development of Hypothesis
 III. Data and Empirical Analysis
 IV. Conclusions
 References

키워드

저자

• Byung-Uk Chong [ Associate Professor of Finance, College of Business Administration, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Korea, ] Corresponding author,
• Pyung-Sig Yoon [ Professor of Finance, College of Business Administration, Chungnam National University, Daejoen, ]
• Ha-Chin Yi [ Associate Professor of Finance, Department of Finance and Economics, McCoy College of Business Administration, Texas State University-San Marcos, ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330