Earticle

초록

영어

This paper examines how the market for corporate control can be misused by malicious corporate raiders to expropriate target minority shareholders and creditors when investor protection is poor. Our perspective is distinct from the conventional free cash flow theory where the central conflict of interests lies between bidder’s shareholders and managers. Using a large sample of publicly traded firms in Korea, we find that explicit looting through embezzlement or breach of fiduciary duty as well as forced delisting is much more common in firms that recently went through a change in control. This finding is robust to controlling for the factors that induced the control change in the first stage. Such misbehaviors are more likely in firms with more liquid assets and stable performance. Market reactions to changes in control are significantly negative for those firms that later become subject to embezzlement, breach of duty or forced delisting. These finding strongly suggest that the market for corporate control in poor investor protection environment may not function as a disciplining mechanism but rather as a potential tunneling channel which raiders take advantage of.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Related Literature
 3. Data and Sample
 4. Which target characteristics attract potential raiders?
 5. Corporate Misbehaviors subsequent to Changes in Control
 6. Announcement Returns around Changes in Control
 7. Conclusion
 References
 Table
 Figure

키워드

저자

• Hee Sub Byun [ Korea University Business School ]
• Woojin Kim [ Korea University Business School ]
• Eun Jung Lee [ Korea University Business School ]
• Kyung Suh Park [ Korea University Business School ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330