Earticle

초록

영어

This paper investigates the effects of managerial ownership on shareholder wealth gains in management buyouts to study whether target managers expropriate public shareholder interests when they buy out a firm. We find that the transaction premiums are negatively associated with the buyout managers’ stock holdings, but not with their option holdings. This evidence indicates that acquiring managers, using their corporate power associated with their stock holdings, pursue their own interests at the expense of public shareholders, and that their interest in the post-buyout firm dominates their interest associated with their options. We also find that the transaction premiums are not associated with the nonbuyout managers’ stock and option holdings.

목차

Abstract
 1. Development of Hypotheses
  1.1 Managerial Involvement in a Going-Private Process
  1.2 Stock and Option Hypotheses
 2. The MBO Sample
 3. Managerial Stock and Option Holdings
  3.1 Identification of buyout and non-buyout manager teams
  3.2 Stock and option holdings of a manager team
  3.3 Summary of the managerial stock and option holdings
 4. Empirical Analysis
  4.1 Variables in the analysis
  4.2 Results for the buyout manager teams
  4.3 Results for the non-buyout manager teams
  4.4 Robustness
 5. Conclusion
 Appendix
 References
 Table

키워드

저자

• Kai Chen [ Tillman School of Business, Mount Olive College, Mount Olive, NC 28365 ]
• Yong-Cheol Kim [ Lubar School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201 ]
• Richard D. Marcus [ Lubar School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201 ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330