Earticle

초록

영어

This paper presents a model of corporate takeovers in a framework of auctions with multidimensional signals. The model considers a target firm whose value for each bidder is composed of both common and private values. A key novel feature of our model is that bidders privately observe a noisy signal that is positively but imperfectly correlated with the common value. Absent a noisy signal, which is true in most extant studies of common value auctions, bidders would be informed of a common value factor that is independent of each other. A symmetric equilibrium is developed where inefficient takeovers may take place because information regarding common value cannot be aggregated. Furthermore, we show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the probability of inefficient takeovers and the precision of information.

목차

Abstract
 1. INTRODUCTION
 2 THE BASIC MODEL
  2.1 The Market for Corporate Control
  2.2 Information Structure
  2.3 The bidding process and the sequence of events
 3. BENCHMARK: THE PURE COMMON VALUE AUCTION
  3.1 The common value
  3.2 Bidding strategies and a symmetric equilibrium
 4. MULTIDIMENSIONAL SIGNALS AND INEFFICIENT CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
  4.1 Inefficient takeovers
  4.2 Information precision and the probability of inefficient takeovers
 5. CONCLUSION
 Appendix
 REFERENCES

키워드

저자

• Jeongsun Yun [ Assistant Professor, College of Business Administration, Kookmin University ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330