Earticle

초록

영어

Using information on business, professional and social ties of directors, we examine how board independence and lack of independence affect firm value. Independent outsiders improve firm value on average while friendly outsiders have negative impact. Independent boards as monitor perform better in large firms with less-information asymmetry and high transparency. However, friendly boards increase firm value more than independent boards when facing financial volatility and M&A threats. Furthermore, politically connected friendly outsiders have more positive impacts on the domestic companies. Our results suggest that the effectiveness of boards’ multiple roles as monitor, advisor, and facilitator depends on their independence and corporate environments.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Previous Literature on the Role of Outside Directors and Hypotheses
  2.1. Role of Outside Directors
  2.2 Hypotheses
 3. Sample selection and data
  3.1. Data Sources
  3.2. Regression variables
  3.3. Data description
 4. Empirical design and results
  4.1. Valuation effect of board independence/friendliness
  4.2. Board Monitoring and Information Environments
  4.3. Advising and Financial Volatility
  4.4. Board as Facilitator and Regulatory Environments
 5. Conclusion
 REFERENCES
 Table
 Appendix

키워드

저자

• Sung Wook Joh [ College of Business Administration Seoul National University, Korea ]
• Jin-Young Jung [ College of Business Administration Seoul National University, Korea ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330