Earticle

초록

영어

We examine the relation between CEO reputation and corporate opacity. CEOs with high reputations have incentives to protect their reputations by enhancing their firms’ information environment, thereby decreasing opacity. However, highly reputed CEOs can become distracted as a result of their notoriety and resort to rentseeking behavior (e.g., earnings management), thereby increasing opacity. Using multiple proxies for CEO reputation and an opacity index comprised of commonly used proxies for information asymmetry, we find that firms with highly reputed CEOs are associated with lower opacity, suggesting that CEOs act to protect their reputations by increasing the flow of information to the market. Results are robust to a changes specification. We also show that CEO reputation matters most when firms have relatively weak governance environments. We also examine this issue from an investor perspective and find that firm value is increasing in CEO reputation, suggesting that investors perceive that highly reputed CEOs improve the information environment. Overall, our paper provides empirical evidence on the economic consequences associated with CEO characteristics.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Literature Review and Hypotheses
 3. Sample and Data
  3.1 Sample
  3.2 Data
 4. Research Design
 5. Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Empirical Results
  5.1 Descriptive Statistics
  5.2 Spearman Correlations
  5.3 Regression Results for CEO Reputation and Opacity
  5.4 Relation between Opacity, CEO Reputation, and Governance Environment
  5.5 Relation between CEO Reputation and Firm Value
 6. Summary and Conclusion
 References
 Table

저자

• Bok Baik [ College of Business Seoul National University ]
• Paul Brockman [ College of Business and Economics Lehigh University ]
• David B. Farber [ Trulaske College of Business University of Missouri ]
• Sam Lee [ College of Business Administration University of Illinois at Chicago ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330