Ayca Altintig, Tomas Mantecon, James Conover, Kyojik “Roy” Song
언어
영어(ENG)
URL
https://www.earticle.net/Article/A242824
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12,000원
원문정보
초록
영어
Equity method (EM) reporting of off-balance sheet investments offers managers discretion to manipulate earnings and keep the debt of their investments off their own balance sheet. Consistent with these concerns, our results suggest that the use of EM reporting negatively affects the quality of earnings information. The evidence also suggests that managers of U.S. firms take advantage of the discretion provided by the EM to conceal debt. These results are especially relevant when the investment is a joint venture. The analysis shows that financial markets incorporate into prices any expected loss of informativeness derived from the reporting of off-balance investments.
목차
Abstract I. Prior literature and hypotheses I.A Literature review I.B Hypotheses II. The extensiveness of the use of off-balance sheet investments and firm characteristics III. Effects on uncertainty on future EPS and Leverage of off-balance sheet investments III.A The effects of off-balance sheet investments on EPS uncertainty III.B The effects of off-balance sheet investments and uncertainty on firm leverage III. The effects of the type of EM Investment and of the information provided on the investment III.A Relationships between the information provided on the investee and EPS uncertainty. III.B Impact of the type of investment on future EPS uncertainty III.C Do firms use minority investments to conceal debt? III.D Decision to report detailed information in investees IV. Valuation effects of EM IV.A Event study analysis IV.B Relationship between EM accounting and Tobin’s Q IV.C Long-run stock performance V. Conclusions Table References