Earticle

초록

영어

We show how target debt ratios in book value terms applied to new investment can be used to improve alignment of investment incentives toward value maximization in firms with risky debt outstanding and asymmetric information. While wealth transfer from both agency conflicts can reduce the value of existing equity, new debt offsets the value loss to old shareholders. Since financing a part of investments with new debt set by book debt ratios offsets wealth transfer effects, firms will not pass up valuable investment opportunities and will make optimal investment decisions. Numerical examples show that both agency conflicts can be eliminated with new debt set by a target book debt ratio.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Target Debt Ratios which Preserve Incentives to Invest in Profitable Projects
  2.1 Investment with all equity
  2.2 Investment partially financed with new debt
 3. Setting Target Debt Ratios in Book Value Terms
 4. The Underinvestment Problem with Asymmetric Information
 5. Numerical Examples
  5.1 Resolving the Underinvestment Problem with Risky Debt
  5.2 Resolving the Underinvestment Problem with Asymmetric Information
  5.3 Target debt ratios: book vs. market
  5.4 A range in debt ratios for investment incentives
 6. Conclusion
 Appendix
 References
 Table

키워드

저자

• Unyong Pyo [ Unyong Pyo, Faculty of Business, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, L2S3A1, Canada. ] Corresponding author
• Yong-Jae Shin [ Department of Business Administration, Soong-Eui Women’s College, Seoul ]
• Howard E. Thompson [ Professor Emeritus, School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 975 University Avenue, Madison, Wisconsin ]

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  한국재무학회 학술대회

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  2006~2024

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