Earticle

초록

영어

This paper examines whether high information asymmetry problems lower positive impacts of board independence on firm value. Independent directors are outside directors who have no ties with the firm at either a professional or personal level. We adopt various proxies for information transaction costs from market microstructure literature and volatile corporate situations such as growth opportunities, risks, credit rating, or financial distress. Using data on publicly listed firms and their directors from 1999 to 2006 in Korea, we find that independent directors are correlated with higher corporate value when the firm faces lower information asymmetry. These results suggest that the monitoring role of independent directors is limited when transferring firm-specific information is costly.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Board Independence and Information Asymmetry
 3. Sample selection and data
 4. Empirical design and results
  4.1. Measuring the degree of information transaction costs
  4.2. Measuring the degree of board independence
  4.3. Valuation effect of board independence
  4.4. Influence of information transaction costs on the valuation effect of board independence
 5. Conclusion
 REFERENCES
 Table

키워드

저자

• Sung Wook Joh [ College of Business Administration Seoul National University, Korea ]
• Jin-Young Chung [ College of Business Administration Seoul National University, Korea ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330