Earticle

초록

영어

In this paper, we study the motive of issuing floating-priced convertibles or warrants, known as death spirals, in a country setting where the private benefit of control is high. Using a total of 199 death spiral issuances by public firms listed in the Korea Stock Exchange during 1998-2006, we find a number of empirical evidences that are not consistent with the last-resort financing hypothesis, but rather consistent with the control enhancing or control transferring hypothesis. First, death spirals are not necessarily issued by firms with poor operating performances. Second, death spiral issuers, where control is preserved within the family, experience an increase of ownership by affiliated firms. Third, this group of death spiral issuers tends to perform better than those in which family loses control.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Death Spirals in Korea
 3. Hypotheses
 4. Data
  A. Sample Construction
  B. Other Data Sources
 5. Results
  A. Summary Statistics
  B. Stock Price Movement following the Death Spiral Issue Announcement
  C. Operating Performance of the Death Spiral Issuers
  D. Control Enhancing/Reshuffling as an Alternative Motivation behind Death Spiral Issues
  E. Can there be Two Distinct Groups of Death Spiral Issuers?
 6. Conclusions
 References
 Table

키워드

저자

• Woochan Kim [ Associate Professor of Finance, KDI School of Public Policy and Management ]
• Woojin Kim [ Assistant Professor of Finance, Korea University Business ]
• Hyung-Seok Kim [ Korea University Business School ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

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• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330