Earticle

초록

영어

This paper investigates whether the level of investor protection affects the choice between a full scale merger and a purchase of a controlling stake in an acquisition, and examines the consequences of these decisions on target shareholders’ welfare. Using a sample of 10,402 acquisitions from 38 countries between 1990 and 2003, I find that targets from countries with poor investor protection are more likely to be acquired through a ‘control stake acquisition’ than a ‘merger’ thereby creating inter-corporate control chains. The returns to target minority shareholders in low protection countries are significantly positive in both ‘control stake acquisitions’ and ‘mergers’, but they are substantially lower than those found in countries with high investor protection.

목차

Abstract
 I. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
  A. Expropriation Hypothesis
  B. Other Control Variables
 II. Data and Sample
  A. Acquisitions Data
  B. Proxies for Investor Protection
  C. Ownership Data
  D. Accounting and Market Data
 III. Distribution of the Mode of Acquisition around the World: ‘Control Acquisitions’ vs. ‘Mergers’
 IV. Investor Protection and the Mode of Acquisition
  A. Country/Firm/Deal Characteristics by the Mode of Acquisition: Univariate Analysis
  B. Multivariate Tests
  C. Sub-sample Analysis: Non-U.S. vs. U.S. Targets
  D. Using Different Thresholds for Effective Control
  E. Additional Robustness Checks
 V. Target Minority Shareholder Welfare and Investor Protection
 VI. Conclusion
 References
 Table
 Figure

저자

• Woojin Kim [ Assistant Professor of Finance at Korea University Business School, Seoul, South Korea. ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330