Earticle

초록

영어

The executive stock options indexed to the market are useful as a compensation scheme in that the indexed options protect shareholders from rewarding executives excessively during market upturns. Despite the usefulness of indexed options, most of the large ¯rms in the US have not granted an indexed option. According to academic researches on executive stock options, the probability of expiring in the money is too small to o®er risk- averse executives incentives to work more e±ciently. This paper develops a new indexed option model and explores the incentive e®ects. While there is a similar indexation feature between the existing indexed options and the new one, a di®erent payo® structure has a signi¯cant in°uence on option values and incentive e®ects. We show that the new indexed option has the higher probabilities of expiring in the money and increases incentive e®ects relative to the existing one.

목차

ABSTRACT
 1 Introduction
 2 An Averaging Indexed Executive Stock Option Model
  2.1 Probability of Expiring In The Money
  2.2 Implications of Option Prices
 3 Incentive E®ects
  3.1 Discussion on Value Incentive E®ects in Johnson and Tian
  3.2 Value Incentive E®ects
  3.3 Risk Incentive E®ects
 4 Conclusion
 References
 Table

저자

• Hwa-Sung Kim [ Division of Business Administration, Kwangwoon University ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330