Earticle

초록

영어

This study examines the impact of concentrated ownership on information asymmetry of Korean listed firms and suggests several alternative mechanisms to mitigate the negative effect of such ownership. Ownership structures of Korean firms are likely to be highly concentrated, and controlling shareholders have actively participated in the management process. Thus, information asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders can be particularly serious when there are few mechanisms to protect minority shareholders and control the discretionary power of controlling shareholders. Private information of controlling shareholders may cause higher adverse selection costs in trading activities on firms’ securities, and thus higher cost of external financing. Empirical evidence shows that information asymmetry is positively associated with concentrated ownership, and also shows that the positive relationship between concentrated ownership and Probability of Information-Based Trading (PIN) is primarily driven by the increase in the relative amount of information-based trading. Furthermore, concentrated ownership is negatively associated with the subsequent new information event, indicating that a controlling shareholder protects his proprietary information flow to the public. This study also finds that analyst following can reduce information asymmetry as an alternative information dissemination mechanism, and that institutional investors and internal corporate governance systems can not help alleviate the substantial negative effects of concentrated ownership.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Background and Hypothesis Development
  2.1. Concentrated Ownership and Private Benefit of Control
  2.2. Concentrated Ownership and Private Information
  2.3. Concentrated Ownership and Information-Based Trading
  2.4. Alternative Mechanisms for Information Dissemination
 3. Research Design
  3.1. PIN Measure of Information Asymmetry
  3.2. Regression Specification
  3.3. Control Variables
 4. Empirical Results
  4.1. Sample Description
  4.2. Concentrated Ownership and Information-Based Trading (H1 and H2a)
  4.3. Concentrated Ownership and the Driver of Information-Based Trading
  4.4. The Interaction Effects of Concentrated Ownership with Alternative Mechanisms (H2b)
  4.5. Change and Level Effect of Concentrated Ownership
  4.6. Endogeneity between Concentrated Ownership and Information Asymmetry
 5. Summary and Conclusions
 REFERENCES
 Appendix

키워드

저자

• Hae-Young Byun [ College of Business Administration Seoul National University ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330