Earticle

초록

영어

We present a continuous-time contracting model under moral hazard with many agents. The principal contracts many agents as a team, and they jointly produce correlated outcomes. We show the optimal contract for each agent is linear in outcomes of all other agents as well as his/her own. The structure of the optimal contract strikingly reveals that the optimal aggregate performance measure in general can be orthogonally decomposed into two statistics: one is a sucient statistic, and the other a non-sucient statistic. As a consequence, the optimal aggregate performance measure in general is not a sucient statistic, unless the principal is risk neutral. We further discuss agents' optimal eort choices using a \quadratic-cost" example, which also strikingly suggests that team contracts sometimes provide lower-powered eort incentives than individually separate contracts do.

목차

Abstract
 1 Introduction
 2 A Multi-Agency Problem in Continuous Time
 3 Optimal Contracts
  3.1 Agents' Problems
  3.2 The Principal's Problem
 4 Special Cases
  4.1 A Risk-neutral Principal
  4.2 Identical Agents
  4.3 Two Identical Agents
 5 Conclusion
 References

키워드

저자

• Hyeng Keun Koo [ School of Business Administration, Ajou University ]
• Gyoocheol Shim [ The Bank of Korea, Seoul ]
• Jaeyoung Sung [ Department of Finance (M/C 168), University of Illinois at Chicago, 601 South Morgan Street, Chicago, Illinois ]

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• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

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• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330