Earticle

초록

영어

We investigate a unique period of at least six months and one day, at the beginning of which a group of American companies cancel their employee stock options that are voluntarily tendered in return for replacement options to be granted at the end of the period (the stock option exchange program). As the exercise price of the replacement options is determined by the stock price on the re-grant date, a decrease in the stock price during the period benefits participating employees. We examine the hypothesis that management, when its options are tendered in exchange for replacement options, manipulates the stock price during the period to have a lower exercise price for the replacement options. We find some evidence supportive of this hypothesis. Furthermore, participation of management in the exchange program appears to be costly to shareholders who have to sell before the end of the period.

목차

Abstract
 Ⅰ. Introduction
 Ⅱ. Accounting treatment of stock options and the option exchange program-the case of the U.S. stock market
  1. Accounting treatment of stock options for U.S. corporations
  2. The stock option exchange program
  3. Testing hypotheses
 Ⅲ. Data and methodology
  1. Data
  2. Empirical methodology
 Ⅳ. Empirical results
  1. Abnormal stock returns during, after, and before the waiting period
  2. Does management simply know more?
  3. More direct evidence of opportunistic timing of news announcements
  4. How does the stock market react to the announcement of the exchange program?
 V. Conclusion
 References

키워드

저자

• Dong Wook Lee [ Assistant Professor of Finance, Korea University Business School ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  재무연구 [Asian Review of Financial Research]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-0351

• eISSN

  2713-6531

• 수록기간

  1988~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재,SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330