Earticle

초록

영어

This paper considers a dual channels supply chain including one manufacturer and one retailer. Manufacturer can use their own sales channels, but also the use the channels belong to retails. As the electronic channels are independent of retailer, this will cause the conflict between the channels. Therefore, we consider the manufacturers to cooperate in the electronic channel with the retailer and the electronic channels orders are delivered by retailer to complete. In the first part, we introduce the related content. And then, we establish the theoretical model can realize the dual channel supply chain coordination with revenue sharing based on Stackelberg game. At last, we discuss the effect of retailer's price when electronic channel is independent of the retailer and the revenue sharing ratio of electronic channels on cooperation ,then find the optimal strategy of cooperation between manufacturer in electronic channels and retailer in some cases by numerical examples.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Model Asumptions
 3. When Manufacturers Deliver the Orders of Electronic Channels to Retailer
  3.1. The Revenue Function of Manufacturers Delivering the Orders of Electronic Channels to Retailer
  3.2. Dual Channel Supply Chain is controlled by Manufacturer when Manufacturers Deliver the Orders of Electronic Channels to Retailer
  3.3. Decentralized Control of Manufacturers Delivering the Orders of Electronic Channels to Retailer
 4. When the Orders of Electronic Channel are Independent of Retailer
  4.1. Revenue Function
  4.2. Decentralized Control of Electronic Channel being Independent of Retailer
 5. Optimization Model of Dual Channel Supply Chain
 6. The Example Analysis
 7. Conclusion
 Acknowledgment
 References

키워드

저자

• Jinping Qi [ Lanzhou Jiaotong University Lanzhou, Gansu, China ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of u- and e- Service, Science and Technology

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  2005-4246

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605