Earticle

초록

영어

Political parties have used hard money, soft money, and/or issue advocacy to strengthen party building. But, as soft money and issue advocacy expenditures began to explode, concerns over both the source of these monies and their continued growth helped lead to the passage of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Contribution limits on party contributions, however, remained relatively unchanged under the new law. In this paper we examine what might be gained or lost if contribution limits on party contributions are changed. We examine 88 gubernatorial elections from 1995 to 2002 in 50 American states. Analyses of the total dollar amount of party contributions suggest that less restrictive party contribution limits result in political parties being more likely to contribute higher dollar amounts to candidates. This pattern is enhanced when political parties perceive that their contributions are likely to have a greater impact, i.e., in a competitive election. In addition, analyses of the candidates’ reliance on party contributions are supportive of a similar pattern; less restrictive party contribution limits result in candidates being more likely to rely on party contributions, especially when the election becomes competitive. Findings presented in this paper clearly suggest that the financial role of political parties in an election can be enhanced or diminished by making adjustments in the level of political party campaign contribution limits.

목차

Abstract
 I. Introduction
 Ⅱ. Literature Review and Theory
 Ⅲ. Data and Method
  1. Data
  2. Statistical Model
 Ⅳ. Analyses and Results
 Ⅴ. Conclusion
 References

키워드

저자

• Kihong Eom [ Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Kyungpook National University ] Main Author
• Donald A. Gross [ Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국비교정부학보 [Korean Comparative Government Review]

• 간기

  연3회

• pISSN

  1598-964X

• 수록기간

  1997~2017

• 십진분류

  KDC 350 DDC 350