Earticle

초록

영어

The purpose of this paper is to suggest corresponding steps and further approaches for dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program through application of game theory, bargaining theory, and prospect theory.
In pursuit of the Joint Statement, February agreement, and US-DPRK accord, some suggestions for North Korean nuclear denuclearization are as follows.
First, North Korea has to allow verification measures to avoid a zerosum game, as the US took the step of removing North Korea from the terrorism list.
Second, North Korea has to fulfill its nuclear disablement, and the five nations of six-party talks should carry out economic aid to North Korea based on cooperation in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance in a non-zero sum game with the view of obtaining mutual gains.
Third, North Korea should abandon all nuclear programs, and the participating nations in the six party-talks except the DPRK have to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactors to the DPRK for peaceful uses of nuclear energy rather than bombs, to reduce the possibility using of threats and brinkmanship towards each other.
Fourth, there is a need to establish a security regime in the North for the purpose of guaranteeing North Korean security, inducing to forgo use of threats and violence, antagonism and confrontation, and instead engage in confidence-building measures.

목차

Abstract
 Introduction
 Theoretical Perspective
 Removal of North Korea from Terrorism List vs.Establishment of Verification Regime
 Nuclear Dismantlement vs. Provision of a Light Water Reactor
 Guarantee for Security Regime
 Conclusion
 References

키워드

저자

• Hun Kyung Lee [ Assistant Professor, Dong-A University, Korea ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  평화학연구 [THE JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1738-2580

• 수록기간

  2004~2024

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 340 DDC 320