For the past sixty years, the U.S.-North Korean relations have gone through many twists and turns just like a chess game which has yet to end. In order to get maximum gains, the two countries sometimes confronted and sometimes engaged each other. From a macro point of view, the evolution of the U.S.-North Korea relations in the post-Cold War era is a big game process comprising several organic game phases and it showed different characteristics at different time periods on different issues. This paper attempts to use game theory to analyze the evolution of the U.S.-DPRK relations in the post-Cold War era, and to further predict the future direction of the relations. Through an analysis on the post-Cold War relations between the United States and North Korea by game theory, we observe that not only can the two countries’ conflicts be avoided; their cooperation can also be realized. We think that though both countries have opposite strategies, they recognize that they share at least some common interests, and thus should avoid destroying each other. So, even though the more difficult game was yet to come, we believe that no matter how intense the game is, the United States and North Korea can still maintain a controllable hostile relation. Although it is not easy to say when the game between the States and the North will end now, it is predictable that they will acknowledge their common interests and eventually agree to cooperate. To ensure a more lasting cooperation to be realized, the multiplayers need to work together on multilevel to achieve such goal.
목차
Abstract An Introduction to Game Theory The Concept of a Game The Basic Elements of a Game The Types of Games An Analysis on the U.S.-North Korean Relationsin the Post-Cold War Era by Game Theory The Root Cause of the U.S.-DPRK Game The Expected Payoffs of the U.S.-North Korean Game The Situation of the Game between the U.S. and North Korea The Analysis on the Post-Cold War Relations between the United States and North Korea by Game Theory The Future of the U.S.-North Korean Cooperationfrom the Perspective of Game Theory Keep the Information of the Game Open and True The Fairness of the Game Rules Adjusting the Expected Payoff Establishing Cooperation Mechanisms in Northeast Asia References
Debin Zhan [ Research Fellow of Center of Korean Studies, Fudan University, and a Part-time Specials Correspondent for the Global Times (Newspaper in China), China ]