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Beyond the Hostility: An Analysis on the U.S.-North Korean Relations by Game Theory

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  • 발행기관
    한국평화연구학회 바로가기
  • 간행물
    평화학연구 KCI 등재후보 바로가기
  • 통권
    제9권 4호 (2008.12)바로가기
  • 페이지
    pp.29-61
  • 저자
    Debin Zhan
  • 언어
    영어(ENG)
  • URL
    https://www.earticle.net/Article/A110950

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원문정보

초록

영어
For the past sixty years, the U.S.-North Korean relations have gone through many twists and turns just like a chess game which has yet to end. In order to get maximum gains, the two countries sometimes confronted and sometimes engaged each other.
From a macro point of view, the evolution of the U.S.-North Korea relations in the post-Cold War era is a big game process comprising several organic game phases and it showed different characteristics at different time periods on different issues.
This paper attempts to use game theory to analyze the evolution of the U.S.-DPRK relations in the post-Cold War era, and to further predict the future direction of the relations.
Through an analysis on the post-Cold War relations between the United States and North Korea by game theory, we observe that not only can the two countries’ conflicts be avoided; their cooperation can also be realized. We think that though both countries have opposite strategies, they recognize that they share at least some common interests, and thus should avoid destroying each other. So, even though the more difficult game was yet to come, we believe that no matter how intense the game is, the United States and North Korea can still maintain a controllable hostile relation.
Although it is not easy to say when the game between the States and the North will end now, it is predictable that they will acknowledge their common interests and eventually agree to cooperate. To ensure a more lasting cooperation to be realized, the multiplayers need to work together on multilevel to achieve such goal.

목차

Abstract
 An Introduction to Game Theory
  The Concept of a Game
  The Basic Elements of a Game
  The Types of Games
 An Analysis on the U.S.-North Korean Relationsin the Post-Cold War Era by Game Theory
  The Root Cause of the U.S.-DPRK Game
  The Expected Payoffs of the U.S.-North Korean Game
  The Situation of the Game between the U.S. and North Korea
  The Analysis on the Post-Cold War Relations between the United States and North Korea by Game Theory
 The Future of the U.S.-North Korean Cooperationfrom the Perspective of Game Theory
  Keep the Information of the Game Open and True
  The Fairness of the Game Rules
  Adjusting the Expected Payoff
  Establishing Cooperation Mechanisms in Northeast Asia
 References

저자

  • Debin Zhan [ Research Fellow of Center of Korean Studies, Fudan University, and a Part-time Specials Correspondent for the Global Times (Newspaper in China), China ]

참고문헌

자료제공 : 네이버학술정보

간행물 정보

발행기관

  • 발행기관명
    한국평화연구학회 [The Korean Association of Peace Studies]
  • 설립연도
    2003
  • 분야
    사회과학>정치외교학
  • 소개
    본회는 평화학의 이론과 실제를 연구하여 인류의 평화와 번영 및 한반도의 평화와 통일에 기여함을 목적으로 한다

간행물

  • 간행물명
    평화학연구 [THE JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES]
  • 간기
    계간
  • pISSN
    1738-2580
  • 수록기간
    2004~2024
  • 등재여부
    KCI 등재
  • 십진분류
    KDC 340 DDC 320

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