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Tom Stoppard was considered an ‘apolitical playwright’ owing to his early plays in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But after he released a series of political plays concerning political matters of Czechoslovakia and Eastern European countries in the late 1970s, not a few critics pointed out that he shifted his theatrical ground from ‘apolitical’ to ‘political.’ In relation to this issue, he claimed that he was not always concerned with political matters but deeply concerned with moral issues. He has not been indifferent to political matters but interested in freedom of speech and human rights issues. He argues that the world has taught us all that conservatism in the end simply is not fair enough. Thus, the question is not which is right, conservatism or progressivism but how to balance the free autonomous individual against some form of regulation needed for the common good. He has written a series of political plays concerning political situations of Eastern Europe. In these plays, he conflated a series of events which took place in dissolved Soviet with a set of values of the English middle class. In conclusion, the claim that Stoppard is an apolitical playwright is not in accordance with his career as a playwright. His writing political plays is not a sudden change of mind but a long-standing result of grappling with the problems of Eastern Europe.

본 논문은 1968년 체코슬로바키아 자유화 투쟁을 슬로바키아 관점에서 살펴보고 있다. 68혁명은 프라하의 봄만이 아닌 ‘브라티슬라바의 봄’이기도 했다. 단순히 슬로바키아 사람들이 체코 사람들과 함께 억압적 소비에트 체제에 저항했다는 의미는 아니다. 슬로바키아인들은 체코슬로바키아 국가체제의 연방화라는 체코인들과는 또 다른 자신들만의 어젠다를 갖고 있었다. 체코슬로바키아는 공동 국가임에도 슬로바키아인들은 체코인에 비해 ‘2등 시민’ 차별을 받는다는 불만을 오랜 세월 갖고 있었고, 이를 자유화의 물결을 타고 해결하고자 하였다. 그러나 68년 소련의 개입으로 자유화 시도는 실패로 끝났고, 더불어 슬로바키아도 주체적으로 자신들의 요구를 해결해나갈 수 있는 절호의 기회를 빼앗겼다.

The present paper intends to examine the 1968 Revolution in Czechoslovakia, not from the viewpoint of Czechs but from Slovakians. It can be called as 'Bratislava Spring', as much as 'Prague Spring'. Ever since the unification of Czechs and Slovaks in 1918, Slovaks had long held disagreement and dissatisfaction against Czechs who monopolized the right of running the country. Bratislava wanted to push for the federalization of their common state, as originally promised. However the intervention of the Soviet Army disrupted the course of liberalization reform and brought about the outcome which Slovaks not necessarily intended.(Hansung University)

이 글은 1980년 서울의 봄의 좌절 요인 중 기존 연구들이 과소평가하거나 또는 미처 주목하지 못했던 것을 밝혔다. 기존 연구들은 좌절 요인으로 신군부의 권력욕, 최규하 정부의 리더십부재, 정치권의 고립과 3김의 대권욕, 유신체제와 비상계엄의 엄연한 존재 등을 제시했다. 그러나 이것들 외에도 다른 요인들이 존재하는데, 그것을 찾기 위해 서울의 ‘봄’의 어원인 1968년프라하의 봄과 비교하여 고찰했다. 프라하의 봄과 서울의 봄은 좌절이라는 공통점 이외에는 차별성 더 두드러진다. 프라하의 봄은 ‘인간의 얼굴을 한 사회주의’ 사회를 건설하려는 개혁 시도로, 지식인과 학생들의 반정부 시위를 계기로 개혁파가 지배세력 내부에서 실권을 장악하면서 시작되었다. 시민사회 내에서도 지식인과 학생은 물론 언론과 시민들이 지지했기에 성공 가능성이 높았지만, 외부 세력의 개입으로 좌절되었다. 이에 비해 서울의 봄은 지배세력 내 균열이나 저항세력의 투쟁이 아니라 절대 권력을 지닌대통령의 갑작스러운 사망으로 시작되었다. 당시 민주화 이행에 대한 기대가 상당히 높았음에도, 신군부는 12.12 쿠데타를 통해 권력을 찬탈한 후, 민주화를 요구하는 모든 세력을 억압하고 제거함으로써 민주화 이행을 좌절시켰다. 이 과정에서 여야 정치인은 물론 재야와 학생세력도 신군부의 권력 장악에 제대로 대처하지 못했다. 언론은 신군부에 종속되어 민주화 이행 요구를 외면했고, 시민들도 대학생들의 민주화 시위를 지지하지 않았다. 이상의 비교를 통해 이 글은 기존 연구들이 간과했던 측면들, 곧 지배세력 내 개혁파의 부재와 시민사회의 비활성화, 그리고 언론 및 시민의 민주화 세력에 대한 지지 부재가 서울의 봄 좌절의 또 다른 요인이라는 사실을 밝혔다.

This article examines several factors underestimated or overlooked by previous scholarship, in an attempt to explain the causes of the failure of the 1980 Seoul Spring. Previous studies have presented several causes for this failure: the new military junta’s drive for power, the lack of leadership in the Choe Gyu-ha government, the isolation of political forces and the desire for the presidency of the three Kims, and the existence of Yusin regime and emergency martial law. Yet other important factors also played a role, and they can be illuminated through a comparison between the Seoul Spring and Prague Spring (from which the former took its name). Despite similarities in their common names, these two popular uprisings are more contrasting than they are similar. An attempt to reform society under the slogan “Socialism with a Human Face,” the Prague Spring began when a reform faction took power within the ruling elite, while anti-government protests by intellectuals and students gained momentum. Moreover, since not only intellectuals and students, but also citizens in general and the media, supported it within civic society, it had a high chance of success - only to be frustrated by intervention from outside. In comparison, the Seoul Spring began with the sudden death of the nation’s president, who had wielded absolute power, rather than with a fracturing within the ruling power elite or a significant struggle by opposition forces. Although expectations for a democratic transition were high, the new military junta was able to grab power through a coup d'etat, and the frustrate such a transition by suppressing or eliminating all the forces demanding democratization. In this process, not only the ruling and opposition political leaders, but also the civic and student forces did not respond adequately to this take-over by the new military junta. Further, cowed by the force of coup d'etat, the media did not cover demands for a democratic transition, while citizens in general did not support the students’ protests. In brief, this paper presents these factors ? the absence of reform forces within the ruling elite, and inactive civic society and the absence of support for democratization forces by the media and citizens ? as other key factors in the failure of the Seoul Spring.

This article is one of the first attempts to examine the response of the intellectuals in the Soviet Union to ‘the Prague Spring’ in the context of the 1968 movement. Until now, the research on the 1968movement has been focusing on America and the Western Europe,and there is not enough research on the resistance movement in the Soviet Union. To view the whole picture of 1968, movement it is necessary to examine the resistance movement in the society of Soviet Union which had been the center of the Cold War System. There was no great difference between America’s attack on Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia to keep its influence. It proved that not only capitalism but also socialism has a form of imperialism. As the Vietnam War made American young generation become critical of the political system, and the France-Algeria war gave a great influence on the French intellectuals,so did the attack of the Soviet Union army on Czechoslovakia enlighten the intellectuals of the Soviet Union. Although it was a small scale comparing with the larger scale of the western demonstrations due to the characteristics of the political system of the Soviet Union, the open anti-government movement of the intellectuals against the Prague invasion was very meaningful. ‘The Prague Spring’ influenced the Soviet anti-government movement which was born in the middle of 1960s. Before ‘the Prague Spring,’the movement was limited to the passive campaigns such as for the writers’ freedom of expression and creation, for the freedom of assembly and demonstration, and for the open trial. But the campaigns became radical enough to express the intellectual’s resistance against the government’s policy and to form organizations for fighting against the system after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. The crushing of ‘the Prague Spring’ with military force enlightened the Soviet intellectuals to create their slogan “The people who oppress the other people cannot free themselves.” ‘The Code of Conduct’ and ‘2000-Word Manifesto’ sought in the process of ‘the Prague Spring’ were identical with the seeking point of the antigovernment activists in the Soviet Union. And they were connected with the contents of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform. The 1989 Eastern Europe Revolution was definitely influenced by Gorbachev’s Perestroika,but the Eastern Europe, especially Czechoslovakia’s movement for freedom had influenced on Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost.

1968년 체코슬로바키아에서 벌어졌던 ‘프라하의 봄’에 대한 연구는 대체로 정권내부의 권력투쟁과 소련과의 관계라는 측면에서 분석되어 왔다. 따라서 그동안의 연구에서는 프라하의 봄이 왜 그토록 빠르게 진행되었고 또일반대중들의 전폭적인 지지를 받을 수 있었는지에 대해서는 크게 주목하지 않았다. 그러나 프라하의 봄은 권력의 최상부에서 벌어졌던 단순한 권력투쟁의 결과가 아니었다. 이미 두브첵이 권력을 잡기 이전부터 강경 공산정권에 대한 반대의 목소리와 개혁에 대한 요구가 사회 내부에 퍼져 있었고그것이 권력내부의 개혁파와 연결되면서 프라하의 봄으로 결과된 것이었다. 이런 측면에서 본 논문에서는 1968년 1월 두브첵이 체코슬로바키아 공산당 서기로 선출되기 몇 개월 전에 발생했던 스트라호프 학생 기숙사 사건을 통해 이미 프라하의 봄이 본격화되기 이전에 사회전체에 개혁의 요구가 만연해 있었고 이 사건을 계기로 공산당 내부의 권력투쟁에서 강경파인노보트니를 누르고 두브첵의 개혁파가 승리할 수 있었음을 살펴볼 것이다.

The study of the ‘Prague Spring’ in Czechoslovakia in 1968 has been analyzed in terms of power struggles within the regime, and relations with the Soviet Union. For these reasons, academics have not paid much attention to why the Prague Spring progressed so rapidly. They have also not focused on the full support it received from the Czechs and Slovaks. Actually, the Prague Spring was not the result of a mere power struggle at the top; rather, it was an event in which the voices of the oppressed rose in unison against the communist regime, and the demands for reform spread throughout society. Then, it was connected with reformers within the communist party. This paper examines the fact that the demand for reform had been widespread throughout society even before the Prague Spring and the Strahov students’ protest against the communist regime, which was the key event preceding the Prague Spring.

본고는 1968년 체코슬로바키아에서 발생한 '프라하의 봄'에 대해 소련 지도부가 전격적인 무력개입 결정을 할 수 있었던 지적･사회적 배경을 살펴보았다. ‘1968’로 상징되는 1960년대는 전세계적으로 동･서냉전의 절정기이면서 동시에 전후 체제 전반에 걸쳐 복합적이면서 국제적인 균열들이 폭발하는 시기였다. 서방에서 반전운동, 미국의 흑인 민권운동, 유럽의 68혁명 등 냉전적 사고를 뛰어넘는 매우 복합적인 사회운동들이 개별 사회 질서를 넘어선 변혁 운동으로 등장했다. 또한 사회주의권에서도 1950년대 중･후반 이후 다양한 개혁적 실험들이 진행되었다. 특히 관리체계의 혁신이라는 목적으로 여러 가지 개혁 프로그램들이 실행되었다. 우리는 이와 관련한 체제 내 다양한 논쟁들을 확인할 수 있다. 하지만 적어도 소련에서만큼은 다수의 주류 관리 집단의 인식 핵심에 자유주의적 요소에 대항하는 사회주의적 요소들이라는 사고가 존재했다. 그리고 이것이 체제의 안보를 수호하는 핵심요소라는 생각이 깔려있었다. 최상층에서 중간관리자들까지 이러한 인식을 공유하고 있으며 또한 이러한 인식 속에서 그들은 적어도 1960년대 당대까지 소련과 여타 사회주의 체제 실험이 성공적이라고 생각했다. 이러한 인식의 핵심에 있던 소련 지도부에게 1967-1968년 체코슬로바키아에서 벌어진 사태는 체제 전체의 안보에 대한 위협으로 다가왔음에 틀림없다. 물론 그럼에도 구체적인 대응책을 놓고서 1968년 1월부터 바르샤바 조약군의 침공 직전인 8월 초까지 끊임없는 논쟁이 이어졌다. 무력 개입은 그 선택지 중 하나일 뿐이었다. 하지만 결국 무력 개입에 의한 정상화라는 비극으로 귀결되었다. 이는 당시 소련 최고 지도부 다수의 의견이기도 했지만 무엇보다 소련이라는 체제의 근간인 관리 집단 다수의 인식이기도 했다.

This paper examines the intellectual and social background in which the Soviet leadership was able to make a full-scale military intervention decision on the "Prague Spring" in 1968. In the 1960s, symbolized by the '1968', Cold War confrontation peaked worldwide, and at the same time, complex and international cracks exploded throughout the postwar political and economic system. In the West, very complex social movements that surpassed Cold War thinking, such as the anti-war movement, the American black civil rights movement, and the 68 revolution in Europe, have emerged as transformational movements beyond individual social order. In the socialist world, various reformative experiments have been conducted since the mid-1950s, especially in the aim of innovating the social management system. We can identify various arguments within the socialist regime in this regard. But at least in the Soviet Union, there was an idea of ??socialism against liberal elements in the perception of the majority of mainstream management groups. And they thought it was a key element in defending the security of their own regime. From the top to the middle managers, they share this perception and they thought that the experiments of the Soviet Union and other socialist states were successful at least until the 1960s. In this atmosphere, the situation in Czechoslovakia in 1967-1968 to the Soviet leadership must have come as a serious threat to the security of the entire socialist world. Nevertheless, members of the Soviet leadership continued to debate on concrete countermeasures from January to the beginning of August 1968, just before the invasion of the Warsaw Pact. Military intervention was just one of the options. But eventually it resulted in a tragedy of “normalization” by armed forces. Not only the top leaders of the Soviet Union but also the majority of middle state managers including intellectual elite recognized this military intervention as “normalization” of socialist regime.

This article attempts how South Korea and North Korea responded to the so - called ‘Spring of Prague’ in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Especially, it tries to reveal the mutual relationship and the process of change of ‘Cold War - Korean Peninsula Division - Nationalism’ which spread on the Korean peninsula. First of all, South Korea was called ‘Spring of Prague’ as liberalization, which was both a Anti-Communist perspective and the expansion of anti-Soviet policy in the Eastern Europe. On the other hand, from the point of view of North Korea, ‘Prague Spring’ was a counterrevolution to capitalism and a counterrevolution controlled by “US imperialism”. In August 1968, North Korea first agreed on the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. In the meantime, North Korea emphasized the ‘Ju-Che(주체)’ that should maintain its sovereignty on its own. South Korea emphasized the ‘Self-Reliance(자주)’ of the interests of the nation and the nation because the entry of the Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia was a testament to the coercive domination of the ‘red imperialism’ on the weaker countries. In 1968, the two Koreas, on the one hand, strengthened the existing Cold War logic. On the other hand, they tried to respond to the new Cold War. However, in 1968, the two Koreas did not stay in the existing Cold War strategy, which depends on powerful countries such as the US and the Soviet Union. South Korea emphasized self-reliance, including the establishment of a reserve forces. North Korea emphasized solidarity with smaller countries such as Cuba and Vietnam rather than a powerful country and advocated to fight boldly and independently. The international situation in 1968 is now a multi-polar period, and the fate of the weak countries must be defended on its own in a new Cold War era. Therefore, both North and South Korea are still looking forward to a new strategy of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘Ju-Che’, while still expecting the US and the Soviet Union.