Earticle

초록

영어

This study examines how yield provision in stablecoins affects payment system stability and proposes regulatory design principles appropriate for the Korean market. The analysis is motivated by the growing use of rewards, interest-like payments, and decentralized finance services linked to stablecoin holdings. Although these arrangements may increase user benefits, they can alter the economic character of stablecoins by combining payment functionality with investment incentives. Because the associated risks depend on who provides the return, how it is generated, and what rights users obtain, this study distinguishes three forms of stablecoin yield provision: issuer-based yield, platform-based yield, and DeFi-based yield. The study adopts a theoretical and institutional policy-analysis approach based on prior research, regulatory materials, market practices, and a comparative review of the United States, the European Union, and Korea. Issuer-based yield refers to interest or an equivalent return paid directly by a stablecoin issuer and is generally linked to reserve-asset income. Platform-based yield is provided by exchanges, wallet providers, fintech companies, and other intermediaries that use deposited stablecoins for lending, liquidity provision, margin financing, or asset management. DeFi-based yield arises through smart contracts and on-chain protocols, often after users deposit stablecoins and receive tokens representing a yield-bearing position. Although platform-based and DeFi-based yields differ in their operational structures, both embed a payment asset in financial intermediation or investment activity. The analysis identifies five channels through which yield provision may affect payment system stability. First, it can increase run risk by shifting the motivation for holding stablecoins from transactional convenience toward return seeking. Yield-sensitive holders may respond rapidly to changes in interest rates, perceived risk, platform credibility, or expected returns. Under stress, this sensitivity may lead to coordinated withdrawals and redemptions, increasing liquidity pressure, reserve-asset sales, and depegging risk. Second, yield competition may strengthen risk-taking incentives. Issuers seeking to fund higher returns may increase the maturity or risk of reserve assets, while platforms may rely on leverage, maturity transformation, or risky lending. Third, losses and redemption pressure can be transmitted beyond individual issuers or platforms. Large-scale reserve liquidation may affect short-term funding markets, while collateral links, rehypothecation, margin calls, and forced liquidations may amplify shocks and transmit them to traditional financial markets. Fourth, yield provision may weaken the payment function of stablecoins. As balances become more responsive to returns and risk perceptions, payment-related liquidity may become less stable, and the distinction between a payment instrument and an investment product may become unclear. Fifth, yield-bearing stablecoins may interact with bank deposits, central bank digital currencies, financial intermediation, and monetary policy transmission by encouraging funds to migrate toward nonbank or offshore arrangements. The comparative analysis shows that major jurisdictions increasingly recognize these concerns, although their approaches differ. The European Union prohibits interest on asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation and broadly covers benefits linked to token holdings. The United States prohibits payment stablecoin issuers from directly providing interest or yield under the GENIUS Act, while rewards offered by affiliates, exchanges, or other third parties remain a regulatory issue. Korea has not yet established a comprehensive framework for stablecoin yield provision. Existing rules focus mainly on virtual-asset user protection and unfair trading, while overseas stablecoins, exchange rewards, platform programs, and DeFi services remain accessible to Korean users. This regulatory gap requires a framework that addresses issuer conduct, functionally equivalent rewards, financial-intermediation activities, offshore providers, and personal-wallet transfers. Based on this analysis, the study proposes a function-based and risk-sensitive framework for Korea. Issuer-based yield on payment stablecoins should, in principle, be prohibited because it may undermine reserve safety, encourage yield-seeking asset management, and make payment stablecoins resemble unprotected deposits. Platform-based yield should not be governed by a uniform prohibition or permission. Regulation should distinguish rewards linked to actual payment or service use from returns paid merely for holding or depositing stablecoins. Where a platform conducts lending, maturity transformation, asset management, or other financial intermediation, enhanced requirements should apply, including authorization or registration, segregation of customer assets, liquidity and risk-management standards, disclosure of the source of returns, and controls on conflicts of interest. DeFi-based yield should be structurally separated from payment stablecoins and regulated as an investment product or high-risk financial service when it involves smart-contract risk, oracle risk, leverage, rehypothecation, or liquidity shortfalls. The study further emphasizes standardized risk disclosure, clear redemption terms, restrictions on misleading descriptions, and integrated supervision covering issuers, platforms, custodians, exchanges, and offshore access channels. These measures should be coordinated with Korea’s electronic finance, banking, capital market, virtual-asset, CBDC, and monetary policy frameworks. The main contribution of this study is to treat stablecoin yield provision not as a peripheral product feature but as an institutional issue affecting payment infrastructure and financial stability. Because the analysis is primarily theoretical and institutional, future research should empirically examine liquidity volatility, redemption behavior, depegging risk, and the market-wide effects of platform-based and DeFi-based yield structures.

한국어

본 연구는 스테이블코인 수익 제공(yield provision) 구조가 지급결제 시스템의 안정성에 미치는 영향을 이론적‧제도적 관점에서 분석하고 한국 시장에 적합한 규제 설계 방향을 제시한다. 스테이블코인 수익 제공 구조를 발행사 이자, 플랫폼 이자, DeFi 수익의 세 유형으로 구분하고, 각 유형이 보유 동기를 결제 목적에서 수익 추구 중심으로 변화시켜 런 위험, 위험 추구 유인, 시스템 리스크 전이, 결제 기능의 약화, CBDC 및 통화정책과의 상호작용에 미치는 경로를 분석하였다. 또한 미국의 GENIUS Act, 유럽연합의 MiCA, 한국의 현행 제도와 입법 논의를 비교하여 제도적 공백과 정책적 함의를 도출하였다. 분석 결과, 수익 제공 구조는 스테이블코인을 단순 결제 수단이 아니라 투자성 자산으로 인식하게 함으로써 유동성 부담과 상환 불확실성을 증가시킬 수 있으며, 발행사·플랫폼·DeFi의 구조적 차이로 인해 일률적 규제보다 기능과 위험에 따른 차등 규율이 필요한 것으로 나타났다. 이에 본 연구는 지급결제형 스테이블코인에 대한 발행사 이자의 원칙적 금지, 플랫폼 이자에 대한 금융중개 기능별 차등규율, DeFi 수익 상품과 지급결제형 스테이블코인의 구조적 분리를 핵심 규제 원칙으로 제안한다. 또한 표준화된 위험 공시, 명확한 상환 조건, 오인 방지 규제와 함께 역외거래를 포함한 통합적인 감독체계의 구축이 필요함을 강조한다. 본 연구는 스테이블코인의 수익 제공을 단순한 금융상품 설계의 문제가 아니라, 지급결제 인프라의 안정성과 연결된 제도적 쟁점으로 본다는 점에서 의의가 있다.

목차

요약
Abstract
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 스테이블코인 수익 제공의 개념과 유형
1. 스테이블코인의 경제적 기능과 수익 제공의 의미
2. 발행사 이자(Issuer-based Yield)
3. 플랫폼 이자(Platform-based Yield)
4. DeFi 수익(DeFi-based Yield)
5. 소결
Ⅲ. 스테이블코인 수익 제공과 지급결제 시스템의 안정성
1. 런(Run) 위험의 확대
2. 위험 추구 유인의 증가
3. 시스템 리스크 전이
4. 결제 기능의 약화
5. CBDC 및 통화정책과의 상호작용
6. 소결
Ⅳ. 스테이블코인의 수익 제공에 대한 국제 규제 비교
1. 미국: 금지 중심 접근과 입법 논쟁
2. 유럽연합(EU): MiCA 체계 하의 금지 원칙
3. 한국: 단계적 접근과 제도 공백
4. CBDC 맥락과 국제 논의의 변화
5. 소결 및 정책적 시사점
Ⅴ. 한국형 규제 설계 제안
1. 규제 설계의 기본 원칙
2. 원칙적 금지와 기능별 차등 규율
3. 공시 및 소비자보호 체계
4. 제도 개선 방안
5. 정책 시나리오 비교
Ⅵ. 결론
References

키워드

저자

• 김지연 [ Jiyeon Kim | 서울시립대학교 경영대학 박사과정 ]
• 임현중 [ Hyun Joong Im | 서울시립대학교 경영대학 교수 ] 교신저자

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  재무연구 [Asian Review of Financial Research]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-0351

• eISSN

  2713-6531

• 수록기간

  1988~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재,SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330