Earticle

초록

영어

Our study challenges the belief that the mandatory bid rule (MBR) raises acquisition costs and deters takeovers. Leveraging the staggered adoptions of the mandatory bid rule (MBR) globally, we find that the MBR reduces the control premium, a key component of acquisition costs. Moreover, evidence does not support the claim that MBR discourages acquisitions above the threshold. While post-MBR ownership levels from block trades decline slightly, the likelihood of crossing the threshold remains unchanged. In the U.K., private deals above the threshold are fewer than below, but this gap is even larger in the U.S., which does not have an MBR.

목차

Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Literature Review and Hypotheses
1. Existing Literature
2. Hypotheses Development
Ⅲ. Data and Research Design
1. Sample Construction
2. Variable Definitions
3. Summary Statistics
4. Research Design
Ⅳ. Results
1. MBR and Control Premium
2. MBR and Private Benefits of Control
3. MBR and Post-Block Trade Ownership Manipulation
4. MBR and Post-Block Trade Ownership Sizes
5. MBR and Deal Frequency
Ⅴ. Robustness Check
1. Alternative Measures of Control Premium
2. Time-varying Country-level Factors
Ⅵ. Conclusion
References

키워드

저자

• Yongjoon Lee [ Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan ]
• Bushik Kim [ Korea University Business School ]
• Woochan Kim [ Korea University Business School ] Corresponding Author

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  재무연구 [Asian Review of Financial Research]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-0351

• eISSN

  2713-6531

• 수록기간

  1988~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재,SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330