The paper tried to analyze the problems and their solutions of ocean pollution control institutions focused on the oil spill accidents in Korea. The analysis was conducted from the perspective of principal-agent theory. The results of the analysis indicated that there existed agent's problems such as adverse selection, moral hazard, and complexity of external structure in the process of operating the ocean pollution control institutions: selecting private controlling enterprises based on bribery (adverse selection and moral hazard), private controlling enterprises' flattery to polluters (funding for them) and their disobedience to coast guard (complexity of external structure). The paper suggested a few of solutions for the problems: improvement of informational system, enhancement of incentive system, and simplification of principal-agent relationship.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론 Ⅱ. 이론 및 선행연구 Ⅲ. 제도와 대리인 문제 Ⅳ. 제도개선 방안 V. 결론 참고문헌