Earticle

초록

영어

Research suggests that overconfident managers often harm firm value by taking excessive risks due to overly optimistic future outlooks or inflated self-assessments (Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Overconfident CEOs are reported to overestimate the expected returns from uncertain ventures. However, Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) present evidence that overconfident CEOs, who tend to be more enthusiastic about challenging and risky projects, invest more in innovation and often succeed, introducing the "overconfident manager puzzle" where such managers enhance rather than damage firm value. This study aims to test these conflicting findings in the context of Korean firms. It explores the hypothesis that optimistic managers—unlike overconfidence, which is traditionally viewed as harming firm value through overinvestment—might instead be innovators who enhance firm value. The study utilizes a novel methodology involving machine learning to measure managerial overconfidence. Unlike U.S. studies that often use stock options as indicators, this research leverages text analysis of managerial opinions disclosed in business reports, using the BERT machine learning model to quantify optimism. The ambiguity in measuring overconfidence in previous studies is another consideration. Psychologically, overconfidence is seen as an irrational bias, but empirical variables might capture a manager’s rational optimism about the future. If a manager’s outlook is rational, overconfidence could lead to positive outcomes, unlike the negative connotations typically associated with it. Many studies interchange overconfidence with optimism, where the former implies irrational excessive confidence and the latter signifies a positive future outlook. Generally, overconfident CEOs are believed to make poor decisions by overestimating future performance and underestimating risks, leading to value-destroying mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). Such CEOs are often reported to overpay in M&A deals, necessitating strict control through compensation and governance structures. Overconfident managers also tend to invest more than their less confident counterparts, potentially harming firm value through overinvestment (Moez and Amina, 2008; Chen, Ho, and Ho, 2014). Conversely, some researchers highlight the positive roles of overconfidence. It can enhance decision-making execution, encourage necessary risk-taking for shareholder benefit, and stimulate entrepreneurial activities (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992; Goel and Thaker, 2008; Bernardo and Welch, 2001). Hirshleifer et al. (2012) found that overconfidence negatively impacts acquisitions but positively influences innovation. They suggest that overconfident managers in firms with innovation opportunities can achieve significant success, unlike those in firms without such opportunities who might make detrimental acquisition decisions. The study’s empirical analysis yielded several key findings. First, contrary to expectations, there was a negative relationship between CEO Optimism and risk, as measured by stock return volatility, suggesting that optimistic CEOs do not prefer riskier projects unlike overconfident CEOs. However, this relationship turned positive when controlling for capital availability, indicating that optimistic CEOs choose risky projects when capital is accessible. This implies that the measure of optimism might reflect rational optimism rather than irrational bias. Second, optimistic CEOs were found to increase R&D investments and engage more in innovation activities, such as filing patents. Third, they tend to hold more cash to seize future investment opportunities. Last, optimistic CEOs were confirmed to enhance firm value, aligning with Hirshleifer et al. (2012), suggesting that they are rational optimists driving innovation rather than irrationally overconfident leaders. In conclusion, the study reaffirms that optimistic managers can be seen as rational optimists whose confidence drives innovation and firm value enhancement, challenging the traditional view of overconfidence as purely detrimental.

한국어

과신 경영자는 자신의 능력에 대한 과도한 판단으로 인해 더 위험한 프로젝트를 수행하고 따라서 기업 가치에 부정적인 영향을 준다는 연구와 적극적인 혁신 활동을 통해서 기업 가치를 높인다는 실증 결과가 서로 상충되는 과신 경영자 퍼즐(overconfident manager puzzle)이 존재한다. 본 연구는 선행연구에서 사용한 과신 변수가 실제로는 미래에 대한 낙관적인 전망(optimistic perspective)을 측정하고 있음에 착안하여, 비현실적이거 나 근거가 희박한 낙관성을 과신(unrealistic optimism)으로, 현실에 근거한 긍정적인 전망은 낙관성(realistic optimism)으로 구분한다. 2009년부터 2020년 동안 8,382개 국내 표본을 대상으로 한 본 연구의 주요 결과는 다음과 같다. 경영자가 낙관적인 전망을 가질수록 주가 수익률의 변동성으로 측정한 투자 위험성이 줄어드는 음(-)의 관계를 나타냈는데, 이는 과신 경영자가 위험한 투자를 실행한다는 일부 선행 연구의 예측과 다른 결과이다. 또한 국내에서 낙관적 전망의 경영자는 더 많은 R&D 투자를 하고, 더 많은 특허를 만들고, 더 많은 현금 보유량을 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 혁신 활동의 결과로 인해 낙관적인 경영자의 기업일수록 Tobin’s Q로 측정한 기업 가치가 증가한다는 사실을 발견했다. 본 연구의 결과는 미래에 대해 낙관적 전망을 가진 경영자가 과도한 위험 투자보다는 혁신을 강화하는 효율적인 투자 활동을 통해 기업 가치를 높이고 있음을 의미하며, 미래에 대해 낙관적 전망을 가진 경영자가 비이성적 심리적 편향(bias) 보다는 현실에 근거한 낙관성(realistic optimism)을 가지고 있음을 시사한다.

목차

요약
Abstract
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 선행연구 및 가설 설정
1. 경영자의 낙관성과 위험한 투자활동
2. 경영자의 낙관성과 혁신활동
3. 경영자의 낙관성과 현금 보유
4. 경영자의 낙관성과 기업가치
Ⅲ. 연구방법과 연구모형
1. 경영자의 낙관성 변수
2. 혁신 활동 변수
3. 기타 변수
4. 연구모형
5. 표본 및 연구기간 설정
Ⅳ. 연구결과
1. 기초 통계량
2. 경영자의 낙관성과 위험한 투자와의 관계
3. 경영자의 낙관성과 기업의 혁신 활동
4. 경영자의 낙관성에 따른 기업의 현금보유
5. 경영자의 낙관성과 기업가치
Ⅴ. 추가 분석: 과신과 현실적 낙관성
1. 경영자의 과신
2. 기업의 특허 유무에 따른 차이 분석
Ⅵ. 결론
References

키워드

저자

• 최혜린 [ Hae Rin Choi | 이화여자대학교 박사과정(PhD Candidate, Ewha Womans University) ]
• 변진호 [ Jinho Byun | 이화여자대학교 교수(Professor, Ewha Womans University) ] 교신저자

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  재무연구 [Asian Review of Financial Research]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-0351

• eISSN

  2713-6531

• 수록기간

  1988~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재,SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330