Using novel indirect employment data and a Supreme Court ruling against subcontracted employment, I show that the contingent employment of skilled labor reduces innovation. Following the ruling, establishments with a higher reliance on subcontracted workers innovate more compared to those with a lesser reliance. This nding is conditional on compensation schemes rewarding employees for their investment in rm-specic skills and long-term performance, stems from collaborations with existing inventor employees, and does not coincide with increases in operating leverage, R&D, or capital intensity.
목차
Abstract 1 Introduction 2 Institutional details 2.1 Contingent employment 2.2 In-house subcontracted workers 3 Research Design 3.1 Supreme Court ruling against IS employment 3.2 Ruling as a shock on innovation incentive of IS workers 3.3 Establishment-level estimation 3.4 Firm-level estimation 4 Data 4.1 Establishment data 4.2 Firm data 4.3 Propensity score matching 4.4 Manufacturing employment 5 Results 5.1 Covariate balance 5.2 Employment 5.3 Innovation 5.4 Channel I: innovation incentive 5.5 Channel II: managerial responses 5.6 Innovation by new hires 5.7 Innovation by new versus existing inventor employees 5.8 Innovation and employee mobility 5.9 Innovation and employee entrepreneurship 6 Discussions and robustness checks 6.1 Unionization 6.2 Managerial myopia 6.3 Post-ruling changes in employee compensation 6.4 Post-ruling changes in incentive schemes 6.5 Post-ruling changes in competition 6.6 Process versus non-process innovations 6.7 Patent characteristics and inventor identity 6.8 Robustness to alternative speci•cation choices 7 Conclusion References Figure Table INTERNET APPENDIX
키워드
contingent employmentlaborinnovationincentivehuman capital
저자
Sunwoo Hwang [ Korea University Business School. ]