We investigate how dual holders who simultaneously hold loans and equity shares of a firm respond to stock mispricing of the firm. Using the fire-sales shock driven by mutual fund outflows as a measure of stock mispricing, we find that dual holders provide loans with lower spreads to the firms under the fire-sales shock. The result is driven by dual holders’ incentive to support the firm as long-term investors. We establish causality by exploiting mergers between financial institutions. In a firm-level analysis, we find that dual holders’ loan provisions offset the negative effects of the fire-sales shock on corporate investments. Overall, our results highlight dual holders’ unique role in mitigating the real effects of stock mispricing events.
목차
Abstract 1. Introduction 2. Hypothesis Development 3. Data and Key Variables 3.1. Sample Construction and Identification of Dual Holders 3.2. Mutual Fund Flow Pressure 3.3. Flow Shock and Dual Holders’ Equity Shares 4. Empirical Results 4.1. Effect of Mutual Fund Flow Pressure on Dual Holders’ Loan Pricing 4.2. Dual Holders’ Incentive Alignment Channel 4.3. Equity Financial Constraints and Dual Holders’ Loan Pricing 4.4. Instrumental Variable Analysis using Financial Institution Mergers 4.5. Robustness Tests 5. Firm-Level Effects of Dual Holders’ Loan Provisions 5.1. Effects on Stock Returns 5.2. Effects on Corporate Investment 6. Conclusion References Figure Table