Earticle

초록

영어

This study examines the effect of a firm’s ownership structure on its corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using firms that belong to Korean business groups, chaebols, as a sample and their ES ratings to measure CSR, we find a positive relationship between control-ownership disparity (i.e., a divergence between voting and cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders) and ES performance, especially social performance. Additionally, we show that when control-ownership disparities increase due to mergers between other affiliated firms, ES ratings rise significantly. Moreover, we find that firms controlled by descendants are more likely to exhibit higher levels of CSR compared to firms controlled by founders. Our results support the agency view of CSR, which suggests that CSR investment is associated with controlling shareholders’ incentives to pursue their own private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.

목차

Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Hypothesis development
3. Data and measurement
3.1 Sample
3.2 Control-ownership disparity measurement
3.3 Other variables
3.4 Summary statistics
4. Empirical results
4.1 Control-ownership disparity
4.2 Voting rights and cash-flow rights
4.3 Mergers between affiliated firms
4.4 Pyramid layer and position
4.5 Family generations
4.6 ES Score and control-ownership disparity in recent trends
5. Conclusion
References
Figure
Table
Appendix

키워드

저자

• Kyunghyun Kim [ School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University ]
• Hyun Seung Na [ Korea University Business School ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330