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The Strategic Gambit: How U.S. Allies’ Rapprochement with Adversaries Influences American Support

첫 페이지 보기
  • 발행기관
    한국평화연구학회 바로가기
  • 간행물
    평화학연구 KCI 등재 바로가기
  • 통권
    제24권 2호 (2023.06)바로가기
  • 페이지
    pp.145-173
  • 저자
    Lee Jin Myoung
  • 언어
    영어(ENG)
  • URL
    https://www.earticle.net/Article/A435598

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원문정보

초록

영어
This paper aims to test whether U.S. allies can bolster deterrence of U.S. alliances by bringing about rapprochement with their rivalries. The argument presented here entails that defender’s military support to its protégé depends on whether the protégé mobilizes the strategic option to retaliate against the defender if it is abandoned by the defender. Direct evidence to support the argument is revealed in the results of analyses over the entire period 1816-2014. Particularly during the Cold War, the U.S. allies are much more likely to bolster the deterrence of U.S. alliances by building up rapprochement with challengers. Yet, during the period 2001-2014, there is little evidence that U.S. bilateral allies could induce the U.S. support. Rather, U.S. bilateral allies having close trade ties with challengers are far more likely to be targets of dispute initiation. These findings have significant practical implications for Korea. First, in a strategic move to protect its interests, S. Korea should pursue comprehensive ties with its northern counterpart, as a hedge against the potentially unreliable relationship with the U.S. Second, as S. Korea persistently relies on the security assurances of the U.S. and the rearmed Japan, it unknowingly exposes itself to a treacherous game in which the great powers readily sacrifice its interests, people, and territories, all in the name of preserving a delicate balance in the region. Finally, the realization of a fully armed and reunited Korea stands as the essential factor in neutralizing the shared common interests of the great powers on the divided Korean Peninsula, strategically countering their hegemonic ambitions.

목차

Abstract
I. Introduction
II. Forging Deterrence: The Power of Military Alliances
III. The Strategic Role of Protégés in Deterrence: Unveiling a New Perspective
IV. Research Design: Exploring the Strategic Role of Protégés
V. Analyzing Deterrence Effects: Trade Linkages and Dispute Initiation among U.S. Allies
VI. Conclusion: Unveiling the Imperative of Comprehensive Hedging Strategies for S. Korea
References

키워드

U.S. Allies Militarized Disputes U.S. Bilateral Allies Korea Korean Peninsula

저자

  • Lee Jin Myoung [ Northeast Asia Center, Seoul National University Asia Center ]

참고문헌

자료제공 : 네이버학술정보

간행물 정보

발행기관

  • 발행기관명
    한국평화연구학회 [The Korean Association of Peace Studies]
  • 설립연도
    2003
  • 분야
    사회과학>정치외교학
  • 소개
    본회는 평화학의 이론과 실제를 연구하여 인류의 평화와 번영 및 한반도의 평화와 통일에 기여함을 목적으로 한다

간행물

  • 간행물명
    평화학연구 [THE JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES]
  • 간기
    계간
  • pISSN
    1738-2580
  • 수록기간
    2004~2024
  • 등재여부
    KCI 등재
  • 십진분류
    KDC 340 DDC 320

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