Earticle

초록

영어

This study investigates whether pre-meeting vote disclosures by large asset owners can amplify the influence of their votes at shareholders' meetings. We utilize the newly adopted 2019 rule that mandates Korea’s National Pension Service (NPS) to disclose voting decisions before the shareholders’ meeting. Firms subject to this pre-meeting disclosure must meet either of two conditions: the NPS holds at least 10% of the firm’s voting shares or the firm’s weight in the NPS domestic equity portfolio is at least 1%. Employing a regression discontinuity design and difference-in-differences analyses, we find that the NPS pre-meeting disclosure causes other institutional investors to increase their conformity to the NPS votes. We further find that this effect mainly originates from the resolutions that the NPS votes against management; this result is pronounced among the institutional investors who are more likely to face problems related to conflicts of interest.

목차

Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Hypotheses Development
Ⅲ. Methodology
1. Sample Construction and Data Sources
2. Definition of Variables
3. Research Design
Ⅳ. Results
1. Summary Statistics
2. Effect of the NPS Pre-meeting Disclosure Using RDD
3. Effect of Pre-meeting Disclosure Using DiD
4. Conformity to the NPS Dissenting Votes
5. Conflict of Interests versus Information Deficiency
Ⅴ. Conclusion
References

키워드

저자

• Jinhyeok Ra [ Korea University Business School ]
• Sunmin Kim [ Hanyang University Business School ]
• Hyoung-Goo Kang [ Associate Professor of Finance, Hanyang University Business School ]
• Woochan Kim [ Professor of Finance, Korea University Business School ] Corresponding Author

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  재무연구 [Asian Review of Financial Research]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-0351

• eISSN

  2713-6531

• 수록기간

  1988~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재,SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330