Earticle

초록

영어

We empirically test competing theoretical arguments about the impact of common ownership on bank stability: the common ownership hypothesis, where banks decrease risk-taking by internalizing risk externalities on commonly held banks, and the diversification hypothesis, where banks increase risk-taking incentivized by the common owners who diversify away idiosyncratic risks. Using data from the U.S. banking industry from 1991 to 2016, we find that banks with more common ownership linkages undertake less risk, as predicted by the common ownership hypothesis. This relation is statistically significant and economically sizable, which is consistent across alternative measures of common ownership and bank risk and robust to potential endogeneity. Our study adds the financial stability perspective to the ongoing discussions on common ownership and antitrust regulations.

목차

Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Two Conflicting Theories and Hypotheses
2.1 Common Ownership Hypothesis
2.2 Diversification Hypothesis
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Institutional Shareholdings and Mergers
3.2 Bank Risk and Characteristics
3.3 Empirical Methodology
4 Results
4.1 Panel Regression Results
4.2 DiD Regression Results
5 Conclusion
References
Figures and Tables
Appendix

키워드

저자

• Haerang Park [ Department of Economics, Seoul National University ]
• Byungmin Oh [ College of Business, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330