Earticle

초록

영어

Previous literature posits that CEOs with inside debt holdings are more likely to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) since they respond to bondholders’ demands as their appetite for risk decreases. This study examines whether a CEO’s risk concerns moderate the effect of CEO inside debt holdings on the firm’s CSR performance. We find that the positive relationship between CEO inside debt and CSR is weakened when CEOs are close to retirement, or when firms face less product market competition within their respective industries. Our results also suggest that the effect of CEO inside debt, as well as the moderating effect of CEO retirement and low competition, differs between internal and external stakeholder CSR. Furthermore, we find that the moderating effect of CEO retirement is strongly supported in propensity score matching analysis and alternative model specification, whereas that of low competition is weakly supported. Overall, this study has important policy implications for board members, managers, investors, and regulators as it highlights that CEOs’ compensation structure and risk concerns can be determinants of corporate sustainability policies.

목차

Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Theoretical background and hypotheses
1. Executive compensation and CSR
2. CEO inside debt and CSR
Ⅲ. Research method
1. Sample selection
2. Measurement of variables
3. Research model
Ⅳ. Empirical results
1. Descriptive statistics
2. Baseline regressions
3. Hypotheses 1 and 2
4. Additional tests
Ⅴ. Conclusion
References
Appendix

키워드

저자

• Kyumin Cho [ Senior Researcher, Daishin Economic Research Institute ]
• Seung Hun Han [ Professor, KAIST ]
• Hyeong Joon Kim [ Ph.D. candidate, KAIST ] 교신저자
• Sangsoo Kim [ Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  재무연구 [Asian Review of Financial Research]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-0351

• eISSN

  2713-6531

• 수록기간

  1988~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재,SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330