Earticle

초록

영어

Crowdfunding has received a significant amount of attention from the public in the past few years. By lowering the entry barriers, crowdfunding platforms have allowed less-sophisticated investors to participate in an investment market. However, inexperienced crowd investors often lack ability and resources to correctly infer quality of various projects. When making an investment decision, they heavily rely on information provided by the project managers. To alleviate such information asymmetry between project managers and crowd investors, crowdfunding platforms have recently started to introduce a policy requiring project managers to disclose any potential risks involved in the project. This paper seeks to understand the role of risk disclosure policy in crowdfunding platforms and how it may affect the decisions of both project managers and crowd investors. We provide a model of crowdfunding and show how theoretical predictions of project quality and crowd investment differ across a number of disclosure policies. Based on the proposed model, we plan to employ laboratory economics experiments for empirical tests.

목차

ABSTRACT
1. INTRODUCTION
2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND
3. A MODEL OF CROWDFUNDING
4. FUTURE PLAN AND DISCUSSION
5. REFERENCES

키워드

저자

• Keehyung Kim [ CUHK Business School Chinese University of Hong Kong Shatin, Hong Kong ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국경영정보학회 정기 학술대회 [KMIS Conference]

• 간기

  반년간

• 수록기간

  1990~2025

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 658