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보상격차와 기업 생산성
Pay Gap and Firm Productivity: Evidence from Korea

첫 페이지 보기
  • 발행기관
    한국생산성학회 바로가기
  • 간행물
    생산성연구: 국제융합학술지 KCI 등재 바로가기
  • 통권
    제33권 제3호 (2019.09)바로가기
  • 페이지
    pp.3-37
  • 저자
    임정대
  • 언어
    한국어(KOR)
  • URL
    https://www.earticle.net/Article/A363239

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원문정보

초록

영어
It is not surprising that executives take more money than employees do. In recent years, however, great attention has been shown to the question of whether executive’s compensation is too much. Since the 1997 financial crisis, with the introduction of the U.S. compensation regimes, employees in Korean firms are expected to find the ever-increasing pay gap between executive and employees as unfair. So far, very little has been done in this direction. Therefore, this study’s main objective is to draw policy implications as to whether Korea’s pay gap is indeed justified and provides empirical evidence on employees’ incentives and behaviors with compensation-related managers, by examining how the pay gap between executives and employees affects firm productivity. In addition, by estimating managerial ability following Demerjian et al. (2012) and then exploring how the managerial ability affects the relationship between pay gap and firm productivity, this study investigates whether there are differences in employees’ perception over whether executives’ overpay is the pay they deserve. In light of the above, this study hypothesizes that pay gap between executives and employees makes a negative impact on firm productivity and that the negative effect is amplified in firms with low managerial abilities, and test the two hypotheses for firms listed on the KSE (Korean Stock Exchange) and KOSDAQ (Korean Securities Dealer Quotation). Using 17,731 firm-year observations listed on two Korean stock markets between 2002 and 2017, this study finds a negative relationship between pay gap (measured as the logarithm of the ratio of the annual average cash pay of executives to that of employees) and firm productivity (measured as sales per employees or total factor productivity). A tentative explanation for this result is that most employees in Korean listed firms believe that their executives’ pay is unjustifiably high. This sentiment seems to support the equity theory of Adams (1965) or the relative deprivation theory suggested by Crosby (1976) and Martin (1981) for Korean listed firms. Meanwhile, based on the managerial abilities of firms, this study reports that the negative effect of pay gap between executives and employees only occurs in low managerial ability firms. Employees in firms with low managerial ability may consider their executives’ overpay as unfair, while those in firms with high managerial ability accept the executives’ pay as deserving. This study conducts some additional tests. Two main findings remain robust in firm-fixed effect model to alleviate an endogeneity problem from omitted variable bias, in two-stage regressions using peer-firm pay gaps as an instrumental variable to consider a potential reverse causality, and in a dynamic panel data model of Arellano and Bond (1991) for controlling for inter-temporal persistence of firm productivity. Finally, this study tests whether main findings appear differently in subsamples divided into Chaebol and non-Chaebol firms and manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. The negative effect of pay gap between executives and employees is pronounced for non-Chaebol firms or manufacturing firms than in Chaebol firms or non-manufacturing firms. Specially, this study finds the results that two hypotheses are supported in all subsamples except for Chaebol firms. This study first presents empirical evidence on the effect of pay gap between executives and employees on productivity of Korean listed firms. Furthermore, this study also contributes to useful evidence concerning the equity theory or relative deprivation theory by exploring how managerial ability is associated with the relationship between pay gap and firm productivity. The findings in this study may be used as reference for how pay for executives should be determined so as not to impede productivity and then as information to enhance productivity of Korean firms in pay-related decision makings considering managers’ abilities.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 관련문헌과 가설
Ⅲ. 자료와 변수의 정의
Ⅳ. 실증분석결과
Ⅴ. 결론
참고문헌
Abstract

키워드

Pay Gap Firm Productivity Managerial Ability Equity Theory Relative Deprivation Theory

저자

  • 임정대 [ Jeongdae Yim | 경북대학교 경영학부 BK21플러스 박사후연구원 ]

참고문헌

자료제공 : 네이버학술정보

간행물 정보

발행기관

  • 발행기관명
    한국생산성학회 [Korea Productivity Association]
  • 설립연도
    1985
  • 분야
    사회과학>경제학
  • 소개
    본 학회는 생산성에 관련된 학술연구의 진흥과 회원상호간의 친목을 도모함을 목적으로 한다. 그리고 다음의 사항에 주력한다. - 생산성에 관련된 학술연구의 진흥 - 생산성 향상을 위한 산학연계의 확립 - 회원상호간의 친교 및 정보교환 강화

간행물

  • 간행물명
    생산성연구: 국제융합학술지 [Productivity Research: An International Interdisciplinary Journal]
  • 간기
    격월간
  • pISSN
    1225-3553
  • 수록기간
    1987~2025
  • 등재여부
    KCI 등재
  • 십진분류
    KDC 325 DDC 330

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