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Online Platform Competition with Asymmetric Revenue Structures

첫 페이지 보기
  • 발행기관
    한국생산성학회 바로가기
  • 간행물
    생산성연구: 국제융합학술지 KCI 등재 바로가기
  • 통권
    제32권 제1호 (2018.03)바로가기
  • 페이지
    pp.25-45
  • 저자
    Kihoon Kim
  • 언어
    영어(ENG)
  • URL
    https://www.earticle.net/Article/A325879

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원문정보

초록

영어
A new online platform may only charge advertisers to compete with a leading incumbent one that collect fees from its users. When these two platforms compete with asymmetric revenue structures, the result of the competition can be different depending on several factors such as the degrees of users singlehoming, the potential market size, and the price-sensitivity of users charged by the incumbent. It is shown that unless all the users singlehome, the latecomer can overtake the incumbent when the potential market size is large or the price-sensitivity of the user group charged by the incumbent is high. This result is also consistent with the anecdotal evidences in China and the US to a degree. This study first shows that a potential market size can change the winner of the competition between an incumbent platform and a new one with asymmetric revenue structures. When one side tends to join the two platforms at a time, the latter can overtake the former if the market is not mature so that there is a room for its further growth. When Taobao started to compete with eBay China in 2003, the market itself was at an intial stage, so that Taobao could win over eBay China by not charging its sellers. On the other hand, Webstore, a free advertising-based online auction platform in the US, has been far behind eBay since its launch in 2008 was too late to change the winner of the competition. The users’ price-sensitivity also impacts the competition. Unless both buyers and sellers singlehome, if sellers are highly price-sensitive, the latecomer can win over the incumbent even when the potential market size is small. As Barnett et al. (2010) indicate, Chinese online auction sellers could have been unfamiliar with and averse to the idea of paying transaction fees. Unfortunately, eBay China adopted the policy of charging its sellers when it entered the market acquiring the leading local platform EachNet in 2003. Taobao, a small player at that time, did not impose any transaction fees on sellers and so could eventually attract more sellers than eBay China in a few years.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction
 Ⅱ. Literature Review
 Ⅲ. Model
 Ⅳ. Analysis
 Ⅴ. Concluding Remarks
 References
 Abstract

키워드

Differential Game eBay Online Auction Online Intermediary Platform Competition Taobao

저자

  • Kihoon Kim [ Korea University Business School ]

참고문헌

자료제공 : 네이버학술정보

간행물 정보

발행기관

  • 발행기관명
    한국생산성학회 [Korea Productivity Association]
  • 설립연도
    1985
  • 분야
    사회과학>경제학
  • 소개
    본 학회는 생산성에 관련된 학술연구의 진흥과 회원상호간의 친목을 도모함을 목적으로 한다. 그리고 다음의 사항에 주력한다. - 생산성에 관련된 학술연구의 진흥 - 생산성 향상을 위한 산학연계의 확립 - 회원상호간의 친교 및 정보교환 강화

간행물

  • 간행물명
    생산성연구: 국제융합학술지 [Productivity Research: An International Interdisciplinary Journal]
  • 간기
    격월간
  • pISSN
    1225-3553
  • 수록기간
    1987~2025
  • 등재여부
    KCI 등재
  • 십진분류
    KDC 325 DDC 330

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