Earticle

초록

영어

I propose a one‐period model of transaction mechanism choices between a posted price market and an auction market, considering agents’ time preference. Buyers with low search costs search in the posted price market and purchase the products at the beginning of the period. Buyers with high search costs participate in the auction market and get the products at the end of the period. It is shown that there are equilibrium numbers of buyers and sellers in each market, where agents cannot benefit from deviating from their choices, under an assumption about the distribution of buyers and sellers. In addition, when the agents are impatient, some of the listed prices may be higher than the expected winning bid. Moreover, the expected listed price in the search market may be higher than the expected winning bid in the auction market, when the agents are very impatient. It is also shown that the expected winning bid is lower than the expected listed price when buyers and/or sellers have uniformly distributed discount factors.

한국어

이 논문은 시간선호가 있는 경우 판매자와 소비자가 확정가격시장과 경매시장 중 어떤 시장유형을 선택하는지에 관한 분석모형이다. 균형상태에서는 시장유형을 변경함으로써 더 이상의 효용을 얻을 수 없는 균형상태가 있고, 시간선호함수 및 이윤과 효용함수가 주어진다면 그러한 각각의 시장에 참가하는 균형적인 소비자 및 판매자의 수와 그 거래가격을 구할 수 있다는 것을 보여준다.

목차

Abstract
 I. Introduction
  Previous Literature
 II. The Model
  1. Search Market
  2. Auction Market
 III. Market Equilibrium
 IV. An Equilibrium with a Uniform Distribution
 V. A Modification with Heterogeneous Agents
  1. Heterogeneous Buyers
  2. Heterogeneous Sellers
  3. Heterogeneous Buyers and Sellers
 VI. Summary and Implications
 References
 Appendix
 초록

키워드

저자

• Jong-woon Kim [ 김종운 | Professor, Global Business Department, Hannam University, Daejeon ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  응용경제 [Korea Review of Applied Economics]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-5426

• 수록기간

  1999~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 320 DDC 330