Earticle

초록

영어

The merits of M&A are the transparency of management and improvement of corporate governance. but M&A has some demerit. First, Long-term plans are not at investment because of the unstable right of management. Second, earnings is weakened by putting excessive finance for defense the right of management. Finally, partial speculation funds ask often excessive cash dividends and the disposal of major assets. In addition, ownership is a important factor in M&A. The more is managerial ownership, the greater is angency problem because of the effect of an entrenchment. Therefore managers are apt to seek their own profits. For example, managers of bidding firms are infected by hubris, and so overpay for targets because they overestimate their own abillity to run them. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of relationship between the M&A and Ownership structure on the corporate value of 388 korean listed companies in the 2003. and this paper examines the relation between managerial ownership and the probability of being a target firm, and the impact of managerial ownership on target shareholder returns. This paper finds that managerial ownership is not significantly related to Tobin's q for target and bidder firms and that targets are associated with significantly smaller levels of managerial ownership than nontargets.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론
 Ⅱ. 선행연구
 Ⅲ. 연구설계
 Ⅳ. 실증분석
 Ⅴ. 결론
 참고문헌
 Abstract

저자

• 염유경 [ Yu-Kyoung Yum | 이화여자대학교 대학원 박사과정 수료, 성균관대학교 대학원 박사과정 ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  유라시아연구 [The Journal of Eurasian Studies]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1738-3382

• 수록기간

  2004~2025

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 910 DDC 950