Earticle

초록

영어

In Korea, the business groups, as it is called Chaebol, are controlled and owned by families. Although own family members took charge only 3~6% of the whole board member, the higher rank, the higher the proportion of their members. In that, only few of families took charge of higher rank of board member, so they can manage and control their whole companies. After IMF, Chaebols had to carry out major restructuring and the heads of them adopted “the agreement of restructuring of the five groups”. But, chaebol families haven't changed their ownership, instead, they have decided to make professional CEOs to manage their companies. So, they have to choose that companies are manage directly by themselves. It can be issues who owns companies as well as who manages cause the executives can decide the whole activities directly. Also, the heads of groups are representative of groups and they are the most powerful to control whole groups so the issue that which companies are managed directly by them can be material. Most of prior studies regarded the ownership-management structure as a exogenous factor. They researched how the separation of ownership and control affected effectiveness or firm value. But We think own families have the selection power which companies are managed or not. This paper examines which companies are directly managed by the heads of the business groups. As a result, the head of business groups have taken charge of the CEO of representative companies that have large assets or that can be regarded as parent companies that are the oldest among groups or that are listed to stock market, We find that the head-CEO dummy is not sensitive to the firm profitability, so that indicates the head of groups are less likely to consider companies’ profitability. Next we examine the relation between the head-CEO dummy and the disparity between cash-flow rights and voting rights that measures tunnelling, In business groups, the less disparity, the higher ownership structure, so the head of groups tend to manage companies that have less parity. These results show the head of business groups are more inclined to manage directly companies that are widely known and have less disparity in order to control whole groups because these companies have the representativeness, so they have a great influence to whole companies within groups. Next we can research which managing companies own families select when groups establish holding companies or spin off, then we can find that own families want to keep certain companies as managing companies because of governance.

한국어

본 연구는 대규모 기업집단의 지배가족 중 대표자인 그룹 총수가 그룹 내의 어떤 회사의 대표이사직을 맡는 지에 대해 살펴보았다. 연구 결과, 그룹 내에서 자산규모가 크거나 기업년수, 즉 설립한지 오래된 회사 그리고 증권시장에 상장되어 있는 회사의 대표이사직을 맡고 있음을 발견하였다. 이 결과는 총수의 경우 그룹 내에서 가장 대표성이 높은 회사들을 직접 경영하려는 경향 크다고 해석할 수 있다. 기업의 수익성은 그룹 총수의 경영권 선택에 크게 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 부의 이전과 관련하여 살펴 본 현금흐름권과 의결권 차이를 나타내는 괴리도는 유의성이 떨어지고 모형마다 약간의 차이를 보이기는 하나 총수경영과는 음의 관계를 보였다. 본 연구의 결과는 대규모 기업집단의 효율적인 수익성이 높은 회사보다는 그룹 내의 대표성을 가지고 있는 회사 또는 소유구조에서 상위에 있는 기업의 대표이사직을 맡음으로써 그룹 전체를 지배하고자 함을 의미한다.

목차

국문 요악
 I. 서론
 II. 선행연구 및 가설도출
 III. 연구설계
  3.1 표본
  3.2 연구모형
  3.3 변수의 정의 및 측정
 IV. 실증분석 결과
  4.1 기술통계
  4.2 단변량 분석
  4.3 상관관계분석
  4.4 로지스틱분석
 V. 결론
 참고문헌
 Abstract

키워드

저자

• 박경진 [ Kyung-Jin Park | 명지대학교 경영학과 교수 ] 제 1저자
• 오원정 [ Oh, Won-Jung | 연세대학교 박사 ] 교신저자

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  기업경영연구 [Korean Corporation Management Review]

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1229-957X

• 수록기간

  1994~2025

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 658