Earticle

초록

영어

Aiming at the dual channel supply chain which sells a single product, and composed of the retailer as the leader and the manufacturer as the follower, firstly, by establishing the Stackelberg game model, we study the manufacturer and the retailer’s optimal pricing strategy under the condition of retailer’s innovation cost coefficient is common knowledge, then further analyze the manufacturer and the retailer’s optimal pricing strategy under the retailer’s innovation cost coefficient is his own private information, and discuss the existence condition of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium pricing. The research result showed that under the condition of asymmetric information, even the manufacturer has belief revision, his optimal pricing is always consistent with the type of retailer’s optimal pricing, but there are several pricing strategy choices to retailer. Under different parameters’ values, the dynamic game model with asymmetric information possibly exist separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium, and semi-separating equilibrium.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Model Description
 3. The Pricing Model of Stackelberg Game under Perfect Information
 4. Pricing Model of Stackelberg Game under Imperfect Information
  4.1. The Manufacture’s best Response Function
  4.2. The Retailer’s Pricing Decision
 5. Concluding Remarks
 References

키워드

저자

• Zhou Yongwei [ College of Science, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics Zhengzhou, China / Collaborative innovation center for aviation economic development of Henan province, Zhengzhou, China ] Corresponding Author
• Fan Hehua [ College of Science, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics Zhengzhou, China ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of Security and Its Applications

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1738-9976

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 등재여부

  SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605