Earticle

초록

영어

Through the establishment of the capital flight model of asymmetric evolutionary game, this paper focuses on the study of game relationship among perpetrators, perpetrator assistants and government, and analyzes the evolutionary stable process under different conditions by three-dimensional figures. This paper also analyzes and compares features between the two parties’ model and the three parties’ model, connecting the two kinds of evolutionary games and providing a theoretic basis for a better understanding of the mechanism of capital flight and motivation of all groups. The result shows that by making use of expectation, government can control the ESS of capital flight groups by adjusting relative benefits and punishment in different regulation modes. It can also expand the strategy space that is in favor of capital control through the adjustment. In the end, this paper will propose policy suggestions for the control of capital flight according to the research findings above.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. A Model under Three Asymmetric Parties ( 2´2´2Games)
  2.1. Notation and Definition of the Game
  2.2. Replication Dynamics and Evolutionary Stability
  2.3. Analysis
 3. Two Simplified Models under Two Asymmetric Parties ( 2´ 2 Games)
  3.1. Perpetrators and Government Model
  3.2. Perpetrators and Perpetrator Assistants Model
  3.3. Analysis and Example
  3.4. Discussion and Summary
 References

키워드

저자

• Yi-rong Ying [ College of Economics, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China ]
• Ying Ye [ College of Economics, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of Hybrid Information Technology

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1738-9968

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605