Earticle

초록

영어

Concern about the poor performance of traditional shipbuilding industry, in China and elsewhere, is coming at a time when new-type offshore equipments are demanding more and becoming increasingly complex under technology innovation. the government encourages shipbuilding enterprises enter offshore equipment manufacturers, especially the emerging offshore oil & gas equipment ones. The paper explores the problems and solutions in aligning between the government and enterprises during the entering process, following the basic principles of evolution game, and constructs the evolution game model of government-enterprise. It focuses on analyzing the factors of selecting strategies by various game bodies, then discusses the payment functions of main bodies under different strategies, finally establishes the corresponding replication dynamic equation to seek evolution stability strategies. The simulation on the dynamic evolution processes indicates the proposed algorithm is effective and feasible.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Evolutionary Stable Strategy and Evolutionary Game Model
  2.1. Definition A
  2.2. Definition B
 3. Solution of ESS Enterprise Entry
  3.1. Manufacturing Enterprises Expected Revenue Function EM
  3.2. Local Government Expected Revenue Function EG
 4. Solution of ESS Replication Dynamic Equation
  4.1. Replication Dynamic Equation of Manufacturing Enterprises
  4.2. The Replication Dynamism Equation of the Government
 5. Group Replication Dynamism and Stability
 6. Numerical Demonstration
 7. Discussion and Conclusion
 References

키워드

저자

• Xiaoyan Ge [ School of Economics and Management , Harbin Engineering University, Harbin, China ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of Control and Automation

• 간기

  월간

• pISSN

  2005-4297

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605