Earticle

초록

영어

The widespread use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies help to trace a large number of commodity and share the tag information in the supply chain system. However, many ownership transfer protocols are subject to various attacks. We analyze the security of two protocols. Even if the designers claim that their protocols are security, we find that their schemes suffer from forward traceability attacks and tracing attacks. In addition, we show that a weak attacker can retrieve the secrets of the tag with a probability 1 in Kardaş et al.’s protocol. To resist against these attacks, we present an improved scheme based on Kardaş et al.’s protocol by adopting the new key-update mechanism. In the end, we show the enhanced versions provides the forward and backward untraceable security properties.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Preliminaries
 3. Cryptanalysis of Doss et al.’s Protocol
 4. Cryptanalysis of Kardaş et al.’s Protocol
  4.1. Tracing Attack on Karda¸s et al.’s Protocol Under the Weak Attacker
  4.2. Forward Traceability Attack on Protocol under the Strong Attacker
 5. The Improvement of Kapoor et al.’s Protocol
  5.1. The Formal Privacy Proof
  5.2. Security Analysis
  5.3. The Comparisons of Security Properties
 6. Conclusions
 References

키워드

저자

• Xiuqing Chen [ School of Medicine Information, Xuzhou Medical College, Xuzhou, Jiangsu 221000, P.R. China ]
• Qiang Zhao [ School of Medicine Information, Xuzhou Medical College, Xuzhou, Jiangsu 221000, P.R. China ] Corresponding author
• Tianjie Cao [ School of Computer, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, China ]
• Jingxuan Zhai [ School of Computer, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, China ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of Security and Its Applications

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1738-9976

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 등재여부

  SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605